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Health care delivery in prisons is not similar to that in an open community.  Constraints exist 
which may jeopardize the capacity of in-house physicians to provide quality care, or the 
timely delivery to prisoners of care needed outside. Obstacles to delivery of adequate care to 
prisoners in the specific context of the Roumieh incarceration center in Lebanon have been 
identified through an analysis of the current functioning of that system.  
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate an intervention that aimed at decreasing delays in 
external health care delivery to prisoners at Roumieh. The delay time had usually been from 
2 to 4 weeks, a period perceived to be deleterious for the well-being of prisoners. This study 
aims at evaluating the reform in terms of shortening the delays without inducing fictitious 
demands for care. Ultimately, shorter transfer delays will impact positively on prisoners’ 
health, thus, fulfilling the moral mandate of a correctional system towards all incarcerated 
persons. 
 
The study followed a before-after design. Two indicators: 1) the timeliness of transfer, and 2) 
the number of requests for external health care were measured for transferring patient 
prisoners to an external health care provider before and after the implementation of the 
reform. The indicators were collected during a period of 18 months starting November 1
st
, 
2007 and ending May 30
th
, 2009. External health care requests in the month of August 2008 
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during which the new policy was implemented were excluded from the data analysis. 
Furthermore, the evaluation of the intervention was only based on the analysis of non-urgent 
cases. 
 
Upon the implementation of the reform, the delay between the problem report and approval 
of requested medical services has shortened for all types of healthcare needs (radiology, 
laboratory, and hospitalization). However, the intervention did not yield the shortened delay 
expected between problem report and administrative request for all types of healthcare needs. 
Furthermore, the delay between the realization of healthcare services and reporting results to 
the polyclinic from the external health care provider has shortened for radiology unlike 
laboratory, and the delay between the administrative request approval for hospitalization and 
admission has shortened. Although the reform targeted shortening delay across all external 
health care needs, the implementation yielded unexpected administrative consequences such 
as an increase in the frequency of requests for outside transfers. Upon the implementation of 
the reform, the total number of requests has increased for laboratory and radiology 
investigations but has decreased for hospitalization.  
 
This study has also evaluated whether there was evidence of discrimination based on age, 
duration of incarceration, education, or type of disease following the implementation of the 
reform and who benefited more from the reduction in waiting time for external care services. 
This study found no evidence of discrimination in delaying health services or requesting 
health services based on nationality, educational attainment, age, unit or duration of 
incarceration. 
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The implementation of the reform had a direct impact not only on the welfare of prisoners 
but also on the system of delivery of health care services in prisons.  Planned administrative 
reforms are rare in Lebanon, and when they are initiated, they often fail to reach their goals.  
Failure of administrative reforms is even more pronounced in military structures such as the 
ISF administration in particular in the administration of prisons in Lebanon.  These structures 
are notoriously more rigid than civilian public administrations, and the chain of command is 
strictly adhered to, which may discourage any budding attempt at change. That the command 
approved and supported this particular change is a clear indication of a new direction decided 
by the ISF in favor of improving the living conditions of prisoners and upholding their basic 
human rights.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
Health care delivery in prisons is not similar to that in an open community.  Constraints exist 
which may jeopardize the capacity of in-house physicians to provide quality care, or the 
timely delivery to prisoners of care needed outside.  Obstacles to delivery of adequate care to 
prisoners in the specific context of the Roumieh incarceration center in Lebanon have been 
identified through an analysis of the current functioning of that system. Feasible solutions for 
each identified obstacle, constituting an overall administrative reform, have been proposed. 
Similar to all reforms, the suggested reform can face administrative neglect or outright 
opposition. It is therefore important to show during the early implementation phase that such 
a reform may actually be an efficient and effective procedure in the context of prison health.  
This study aims at evaluating the reform in terms of shortening the delays without inducing 
fictitious demands for care. Ultimately, shorter transfer delays will impact positively on 
prisoners’ health, thus fulfilling the moral mandate of a correctional system towards all 








a.   Structure and resources for health care delivery in Roumieh 
Roumieh is the largest correctional facility in the Republic of Lebanon (4,035 square miles; 
pop estimated at 4,500,000).  The Roumieh facility was built in the early 1970s and consists 
of four units of incarceration for male prisoners:  
Unit A comprises prisoners who are sentenced and incarcerated for a period of time 
exceeding one year. It hosts a daily average number of 911 prisoners. 
Unit B comprises prisoners who are arrested and incarcerated for a period of time 
exceeding one year. It hosts a daily average number of 896 prisoners. 
Unit C houses prisoners who are arrested and incarcerated for a period of less than a 
year. It hosts a daily average number of 767 prisoners. 
Unit D hosts prisoners who are arrested and incarcerated for a period of less than a 
year as well as newly incoming prisoners who are arrested for a short period of time 
until their redistribution to the corresponding units. Unit D houses a daily average 
number of 1,009 prisoners. 
 
Roumieh’s population changes all the time, due to different periods of incarceration, and 
different types of charges. Prisoners come from different backgrounds within Lebanon, and 
include residents from different nationalities around the Middle East, North Africa and other 
countries.  Correctional facilities in Lebanon are under the supervision of the Internal 
Security Forces (ISF), a police force administered by the Ministry of Interior.  Inside ISF, 
three of ten units are directly involved with issues related to correctional facilities: the 
Gendarmerie manages the facilities; the Administrative Affairs Section within the Office of 
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the Chief of Staff oversees financial allocations, and Central Administration, which includes 
the Medical Department which is in charge of all health issues for ISF staff as well as for 
inmates. 
 
The health responsibility of prisoners in Roumieh is delegated from the Central Medical 
Department to the polyclinic at the prison.  The polyclinic staff is composed of three general 
practitioners ―resident doctors‖ who attend to inmates around the clock, carry out treatments, 
and prescribe drugs accordingly.  Those drugs are delivered from the polyclinic’s pharmacy, 
and distributed later, by a special team, directly to the patients in their cells. Sometimes 
prescribed drugs are not available at the jail’s pharmacy and family members or non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) working with prisoners have to purchase them from 
private pharmacies. Prisoners are also referred for consultation, when needed, to specialists, 
some of whom come to the polyclinic on a voluntary basis.  If the needed specialty is not 
available in-house, a prisoner may be sent upon prior appointment and accompanied by an 
escort, to be seen by a specialist outside the prison.  The consultation fees, in a system that is 
largely fee-for-service, are covered directly by the Administrative Affairs Section. Physicians 
at the polyclinic or physicians at the external health care providers can occasionally request 
medical laboratory analyses, radiological examinations, or referrals to the hospital for further 
investigation and evaluation, treatment, or surgery if necessary.  The most common areas for 
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Observing the healthcare delivery procedures at the Roumieh Central Prison over the last 
three years revealed that major problems existed in the delivery of timely health care outside 
the prison. The structure of the health delivery comprised manpower and management that 
consists of the policies and procedures that govern external health delivery. Security and 
administrative bureaucracy are structural components within policies and procedures that 
affect the outcomes of health delivery such as delay in providing external care.  Excessive 
delays occur between the time when a health complaint is filed and the time the prisoner-
patient is actually transferred to the hospital or any other health care facility, e.g. laboratory, 
radiology, etc., to receive the care needed.  The direct cause of these delays is the multiplicity 
of layers of administrative paperwork required to get a prisoner to an ―outside‖ health care 
provider.   A reform of these procedures was therefore developed, proposed, and approved, 
aiming at decreasing those administrative layers which are of no value to the care process, in 
order to subsequently impact on delay time and improve quality of care. 
 
b.  Procedures for requesting care outside the Roumieh prison 
When the in-house physician determines that external health care services of any nature are 
required, he prepares a Problem Report requesting this service.  A policeman stationed at the 
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prison is then appointed for the specific mission of obtaining all necessary signatures leading 
to the realization of the request.  The delay to a final approval may vary widely from two 
weeks to two months, depending on a variety of intrinsic and extrinsic factors.  However, in 
emergency cases or life threatening conditions, the delay can be circumvented.  A sick 
prisoner may be transported on the spot to a health facility located nearby upon the sole 
authorization from the polyclinic director, and all the administrative routine procedures are 
completed later on.   
 
However, for all non-urgent medical situations, after an initial consultation, a prisoner may 
be transferred several times to outpatient care facilities, depending on in-house physicians’ 
requests, regardless of whether ultimately he is required to enter the hospital or not.  
 
For each of these transfer requests, procedures can be dissected into the following steps:   
 
Before the transfer: 
 A prisoner requests to see a doctor for a health complaint. 
 A designated prisoner who acts as ―medical coordinator‖ in each Unit of the facility 
registers the prisoner’s request and schedules him to see the doctor on duty the next 
day if the case does not require immediate medical attention. A doctor is available at 
the facility 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Emergency cases are seen immediately by 
the doctor on duty. 
 When the prisoner arrives for his visit to the doctor, the ―coordinator‖ registers and 
dates the patient’s visit in a dedicated register. As there is no unique medical 
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identifier for the prisoners, a corresponding medical checkup number is recorded and 
dated on the prisoner’s medical file as well as for follow-up purposes. 
 The doctor on duty examines the prisoner and documents the results of the check-up 
in the prisoner’s medical file, e.g., drug prescription, paramedical investigations, 
external specialized consultation, or hospitalization. 
 The doctor on duty writes a medical (i.e., problem) report, dates it and signs it. The 
Problem Report is numbered according to a sequential numbering preprinted on the 
Problem Report booklet. The original Problem Report copy accompanies the prisoner 
to the external health care provider and the second carbon copy is kept in the register. 
 
Pre-Reform Transfer procedures (see Figure 1): 
 The Director of the Polyclinic reviews and authorizes the problem report for external 
health care request processing. 
 The Director has to determine which medical facility should receive the patient, since 
only a limited number of facilities contract with the ISF administration for health 
delivery to the prisoners.  The lack of openings to receive prisoners in external 
facilities at any given time is the main ―extrinsic‖ cause which may result in delayed 
care. 
 A police officer from the prison’s administration is appointed with the responsibility 
to oversee the practical implementation of the medical services request.  This police 
officer has to send a ―telegram‖ (in fact, a fax) to the Department of Prisons at the 
Central Gendarmerie Administration through the regional directorate, asking for the 
financing procurement needed for outside care. 
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 The Gendarmerie in turn has to ask the Administrative Affairs Section to allocate 
funds needed to provide the full health care needed by this sick prisoner. 
 The Administrative Affairs Section then sends a ―telegram‖ (fax) of approval to the 
prison’s polyclinic (the ―medical‖ side).  Concomitantly, it sends the approval to the 
Department of Prisons at the central Gendarmerie Administration, which in turn 
notifies the regional directorate, which will then notify the prison’s administration 
(the ―administrative‖ side). 
 The police officer in charge of the file has now to contact the Attorney General to 
obtain the permission to take the prisoner out of prison.   
 The police officer has also to contact the intended medical facility to obtain an 
appointment for the needed health service, which again may not be immediately 
obtained, depending on space availability and the willingness of private facilities to 
accommodate prisoners. 
 Once all of this is done, the prisoner is transported to the medical facility, providing 
that a patrol is available for a transportation convoy. 
 
Thus, approval reaches the prison through two different channels, with two time frames, and 
is then executed at a relatively slow and inconsistent pace.  Prison physicians know and have 
come to expect these delays.  This knowledge may affect their readiness to request outside 
care even if needed.  When the new process will be implemented, changes in the volume of 
the procedures requested by resident physicians are expected to take place, and quality of 




In addition to the routine administrative delays, other operational factors occurring after the 
administrative procedures are completed may also contribute to the delay in health services 
delivery.  These factors include:  
 
1. Specialists may not arrive for their scheduled consultation on time. 
2. Convoys needed to transport patient prisoners to the health care providers may be 
logistically difficult to arrange.  
3. Hospitalization beds provided per contractual agreement with the ISF for prisoners’ 
care may be in short numbers.  
 
While these factors undeniably affect delay times, they are unpredictable in nature.  They 
cannot be targeted in an overall process to improve the efficiency of the administrative 
process, and will likely remain as delay factors for the foreseeable future. 
  
c.  Administrative steps to implementation 
The workflow for the authorization of the administrative reform was composed of the 
following steps (see Figure 2 for the concerned units and departments and Figure 3. Gantt 
Chart for Authorization of the Administrative Reform): 
1. The Director of the Roumieh Polyclinic made a written recommendation for a new 
regulation to the ISF Department of Health which forwarded it to the Central 
Administration which in turn forwarded it to the Staff Unit for evaluation. The 
process took 17 days. 
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2. The Staff Unit forwarded it to the Regional Gendarmerie Unit for study and feedback, 
which in turn forwarded it to Regional Gendarmerie Headquarters. The latter 
forwarded it to Roumieh Prison Administration for evaluation. The Roumieh Prison 
Administration did not object to the proposition. The process took 21 days. 
3. The Staff Unit’s Administrative Affairs Section forwarded its Organization and 
Planning Section (OPS) for evaluation and feedback. The OPS was mostly concerned 
that the new regulation would not conflict with existing laws, regulations, and 
working memos. The OPS needed clarification from the Director of the Polyclinic in 
that regards. The Director of the Polyclinic corresponded through the Central 
Administration Unit’s Department of Health clarifying that the proposed regulation 
does not indeed conflict with the stated laws and regulations. The process took 3 
months and 14 days. 
4. The Staff Unit wanted clarifications from the Regional Gendarmerie Unit (RGU) that 
the proposed regulation would not conflict with existing laws and regulations. The 
RGU clarified to the OPS that the proposed regulation posed no conflict. Moreover, 
the OPS recommended to the RGU that the following proposition be applied to all 
prisons in Lebanon. Consequently, the RGU approved the recommendation. The 
process took 2 months and 16 days. 
5. The Staff Unit forwarded the recommended amendments to the Judiciary Police for 
evaluation. The Judiciary Police agreed with the proposed regulation. The process 
took 9 days. 
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6. The Staff Unit forwarded the proposed document also to the Beirut Police Unit for 
evaluation and opinion. The Police did not object to the proposed regulation after 
consultation with the administration of its only prison. The process took 25 days. 
7. The Police sent it to the Staff Unit for approval by the ISF General Director. 
8. The General Director approved the regulation on August 07, 2008, within 41 days of 
receiving it. 
The total duration of the policy development and authorization process was thus ten months. 
Objectives 
This study proposes to measure and compare indicators before and after the implementation 
of the administrative reform, in order to evaluate its effect on transfer times to outside 
medical care. These indicators are: 
1.  Prisoners’ transfer times to external health care services. 
2. Unexpected administrative consequences, such as an increase in the frequency of 
requests for outside transfers.   
A secondary objective was to monitor whether the implementation was affected by any 
discrimination on the basis of age, education, incarceration, nationality, or type of disease. 
Hypotheses 
1. Timeliness of external care delivery for non-emergency cases, defined as the mean 
period between the initial consultation and final treatment, will be less after the 
reform than before the reform. 
2. The number of demands for transfers will increase after reform implementation. 
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3. Older inmates or those with longer incarceration periods will have smaller reductions 
in mean times for referrals than other inmates. 
4. More educated inmates will have greater reductions in mean times for referrals than 
those less educated. 
5. Lebanese inmates will have greater reductions in mean times for referrals than non 
Lebanese nationals. 
Literature Review  
Administrative obstacles to better care for prisoners have never been addressed in Lebanon.  
The disadvantages of the current situation on the welfare of prisoners, especially in the large 
Roumieh prison, have been brought out in informal discussion with NGOs working inside 
prisons, and by concerned elements within the authority supervising prisons.  One of the 
indicators of the non-interest associated with prisons up to recent times is the paucity of 




Elsewhere however, several publications have provided suggestions for solutions, which may 
or may not be feasible within the current Lebanese context.  Some of these international 
publications were published in the 1970s and 80s.  They were considered of value for this 
proposal as the kind of reform under consideration in Lebanon now actually mirrors what 
was done about 30 years ago in other nations.  The literature review included papers 
describing all aspects of reform in care setting, delivery, management and administration.  
Papers considering mental health issues, however, were excluded.  Mental health, while an 
important source of morbidity and demand for care, is generally much less well-served in 
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Lebanese correctional facilities than physical health.  This important gap in prison health care 
needs to be addressed separately, outside the immediate aim of this dissertation. 
 
a. Administrative reform of health care delivery systems 
Efforts to reform the health care delivery system in prisons started in North America and 
Western Europe in the 1970s, as more inmates started profiting from early discharge to return 
to society.  It was obvious that good conduct which earned an inmate freedom should also be 
accompanied by a good bill of health, so that the freed convict would not become a public 
health disease risk for contacts in the community.  Thus, care in jail had to be revisited and 
improved.  The magnitude and extent of reforms depended on the general set-up of health 
care in a given country, as well its socio-economic development and the philosophy which 
underlies the correctional concepts.   One aspect of reform often found in the shift of the 
administrative oversight from law enforcement agencies to healthcare agencies and academic 
training centers. This shift eliminated several layers of administrative bureaucracy which had 
caused clogging in the system 
3-6
.   
 
Many interesting examples of administrative reforms of the correctional care delivery system 
have come from the already-diversified correctional system in the United States.  The 
administration of the jail system varies in the U.S. according to federal, state or county levels 
of government, and the health care delivery varies accordingly 
4
.  An interesting case-story of 
administrative reform of health care at the city jail level comes from the Baltimore City Jail 
(BCJ) system. Prisoners in the BCJ Women’s Detention Center conducted a food strike for 
several days in the autumn of 1974 in order to draw attention to their allegations of 
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inadequate medical services. In response, a student from the Johns Hopkins Health Associate 
Program initiated a 2-year planning process leading to the implementation in July 1977 of 
new services for male and female prisoners. In the old system, the BCJ employed health 
professionals and administered the program. On July 1, 1977, the Chesapeake Physicians 
Professional Association (CPPA) contracted with the City of Baltimore to assure 
responsibility for all medical services, and to recruit the majority of health workers. CPPA 
and BCJ became co-administrators of the program.  The increase in resources thus allowed 
more time for human and professional encounters between providers and patients, with 
measurable improvements in health care access and health outcomes, measured by length and 




An innovative approach for correctional care delivery reform at the state level has also come 
from Texas, and has since been duplicated elsewhere. Faced with explosive growth in its 
prison population and a legal mandate to improve medical care for incarcerated offenders, 
Texas decided in 1992 to start a cooperative process between academia and the correctional 
system in order to improve the quality of health care delivery to prisoners. A novel 
correctional system managed health care program was launched in 1994. The organizational 
structure of the program is based on a series of contractual relationships between the state 
prison system, two of the state’s academic medical centers, and a separate governing body 
composed of nine appointed members, which include five physicians. All medical, dental, 
and psychiatric care for more than 145,000 offenders, incarcerated under the jurisdiction of 
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, is provided by the University of Texas medical 
branches and Texas Tech University health sciences centers. The health delivery system was 
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reformed to create specialized treatment programs and regionally dedicated prison hospitals 
with a full range of services. Most noteworthy consequences of these structural changes were 
the increase in health care staffing, improvement in compliance with performance standards 
under the managed care program, and statistically significant changes in several disease-




At all levels of the correctional system in the U.S., privatization of health service delivery is 
one of the solutions proposed to improve the current situation, mainly in terms of preparing 
prisoners to be released back to society.  Annually, private correctional health care vendors 
provide $3 billion worth of health care services to inmates in correctional facilities 
throughout the U.S. 
9-11
.   
 
While cooperation with academic centers has been discussed in Lebanon, the idea of 
transferring the decision-making process in prisoners’ health to academic institutions or to a 
private organization, away from the ISF administration, is not even a remote possibility at 
this point in time.  However, apart from outright jurisdictional transfer of authority, 
improvement can be obtained through independent monitoring of activities.  In England and 
Wales, correctional facilities are under regular inspection and supervision from the 
independent ―Inspectorate of Prisons.‖  A reform of the health care delivery system to 
inmates there was implemented starting the late 1980s.  The reform moved health care in 
prisons from jail administration to the umbrella of the National Health Service (NHS) to 
make sure that care delivered to prisoners is similar to that delivered to general population.  
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This move was recommended by the Inspectorate to ensure that a jailed person should not be 




In most other European systems, health care in prisons remains largely under the overall 
authority running the prisons system, whether an arm of the Ministry of Justice or any other 
public or semi-public agency.  The World Health Organization (WHO) has regularly called 
upon European nations who have not done so to follow the UK’s example in delegating the 
health care in prisons to a public health agency, rather than leaving it under the sole tutelage 
of the jail’s administration 13.  Such an independent inspection entity for correctional 
facilities does not currently exist in Lebanon, but it may be advocated and actually 
implemented in the future as part of an overall reform of the jails systems. There is currently 
an inter-ministerial commission discussing the transfer of jail authority from the ISF to the 
Ministry of Justice. In the context of that transfer of responsibility, a major reform can take 
place in which quality control and improvement can occur. 
 
CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY 
Study Design 
This is a before-after study design.  Two indicators: 1) the timeliness of transfer, and 2) the 
number of requests for external health care are measured before and after the implementation 
of the administrative reform (the intervention) for transferring patient prisoners to an external 
health care provider. 
 
Description of Intervention 
As indicated above, currently the delay to a final approval of transfer to external care may 
vary widely from 2 weeks to 2 months, depending on a variety of intrinsic and extrinsic 
factors.  The administrative intervention targeted the various approval steps previously 
required prior to transporting the prisoner to an external health care provider. The aim is to 
decrease delays in external health care delivery (see Figure 4). 
 
Under the new proposition, most components of the transfer procedures within the prison are 
moved down to the polyclinic administration away from the central prison administration.  
This move included the following structural and operational steps:
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1. The police officer responsible for securing approval for external health services 
request as per problem report is assigned permanently to the polyclinic 
administration, and is therefore always available for duty.  This police officer is the 
one who sends the fax to the Administrative Affairs Section requesting allocation 
funds needed to provide external health services to the patient prisoner. 
2. The outgoing request fax is registered in the polyclinic’s dedicated register instead of 
that of the prison’s administration. 
3. The polyclinic administration directly contacts the corresponding health care provider 
to schedule an appointment for the needed health services, instead of the jail’s central 
administration.  
4. The Administrative Affairs Section sends the approval fax directly to the prison’s 
polyclinic, bypassing all other intermediate administrative units. 
5. Once the incoming approval fax is received, it is recorded immediately in the 
polyclinic’s register. 
6. The transfer request is now totally under the responsibility of the police officer at the 
polyclinic administration.  He sends a fax to the prison’s administration requesting to 
transport the prisoner to the external healthcare provider. No other authorizations are 
needed. 
 
Sources of Data  
Data related to non-urgent requests for external health care services were collected from 
administrative records of prisoners to whom external health care services in radiology, 
laboratory, and hospitalizations are prescribed. Data for the reform pre-implementation study 
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were collected from November 1
st
 2007 till July 31
st
 2008, whereas those for the reform post-
implementation study were collected from September 1
st
 2008 till May 30
th
 2009.   For 
analysis purposes, those 9-month post-intervention data are compared to data for the same 
duration in the pre-implementation phase.  Since the intervention took effect on August 1
st
 
2008, the analysis period, therefore, extends from November 1
st
 2007 till May 30, 2009. See 
Figure 5. 
 
A clearance letter was obtained in order to conduct the present research by the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill Public Health-Nursing IRB committee (Approval Date: 
12/07/2009, Expedited Review: 45 CFR 46.110). See Appendix 1. 
Study Variables  
The following specific variables were obtained before and after the implementation of the 
new policy from the administrative records at the polyclinic:  
 
 Date of the medical examination which led to the external transfer request; 
 Date of the Problem Report recommending the external transfer; 
 Date that the external services were administratively requested in response to the medical 
request; 
 Date that the external services were approved; 
 Date of admission date for hospitalization and diagnosis at discharge; 
 Date of completion of investigations; 




Outcome variables are: 
1. Timeliness of transfer: derived from above listed dates.  The timeliness is measured in 
days between the initial consultation and end solution of the patient medical 
episode/complaint, which is either: 1) date of admission, if hospitalization had been 
requested or 2) obtaining laboratory/radiology results, if out-patient investigations had 
been requested.  Mean durations in days are compared over 9-month intervals, and where 
possible month-to-month.  The timeliness is measured separately for the following 
scenarios which can follow the initial consultation: 
 
 Simple/Multiple transfer(s) to out-patient care without hospitalization. 
 Hospitalization with/without prior transfer(s) to outpatient care. 
 
2. Number of requests for external health care in each of the previous scenarios grouped 
according to the ICD10 classification of diseases. 
 
Confounding variables are the three personal attributes of patients that are also obtained from 
the correctional facility database. These are: 
 
 Age of patients. 
 Duration of incarceration in years. 





These personal factors should not affect the delay time directly.  However, they can reflect 
the global health status and the nature and gravity of diseases and their prognosis. In as much 
as epidemiological, demographic and behavioral dimensions of diseases affect the probability 
of being rapidly admitted/discharged from hospital, they impact the delay time.  For example, 
younger men or men not yet deteriorated by a long incarceration may have more acute if less 
complicated problems which require rapid admission but short stays.  In contrast, older men 
or long-term inmates may present much more complex and serious diseases which hospitals 
may be reluctant to admit.  Thus, these demographic factors have to be included as 
confounding variables.   
 
Costs 
While we were able to measure the administrative complexity of the reform in terms of delay 
and demand, we thought we could not calculate the spending costs on health care requests, 
but going back to the polyclinic administrative records, we managed to compute the spending 
costs on all healthcare claims (associated with urgent and non urgent healthcare requests). 
We were unable to capture the cost of non urgent health care requests separately because the 
medical claim record does not distinguish urgent from non urgent. 
 
Plan of Analysis 
All variables were tabulated and presented according to their nature.  Qualitative variables 
are presented as frequencies and percentages.  Quantitative variables are presented as means, 
standard deviations (SD), medians, and intervals.  Frequencies are compared using the Chi-
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squared test, and means are compared using the t-test.  Differences are considered 
statistically significant for a p≤0.05.  Potential confounders were tested using stratified 
analysis.  Those variables with some effect modification on before-after differences were 
included in a multivariate regression analysis depending on results.  All analyses were 
performed using SPSS statistics software version 17. 
 
CHAPTER III: RESULTS 
 
The data associated with the present study were collected during a period of 18 months 
starting November 1
st
 2007 and ending May 30
th
 2009. External health care requests in the 
month of August 2008, during which the new policy was implemented, were excluded from 
the data analysis. Furthermore, the evaluation of the intervention is only based on the 
analysis of non-urgent cases. 
1. Characteristics of prisoners requesting external health care 
A total of  943 prisoners requested 1306 external care services in the study period, of whom 
710 (75.3%) did so only once.  Of the services requested, 462 (35.4%) were filed before the 
reform implementation and the rest after that date.  Of the 943 prisoners, the majority (40%) 
had an intermediate level of education. The average age was 39.4 years and the average 
duration of incarceration was 44.8 months.  Details can be seen in Table 1. 
2. Distribution of external health care requests after reform  
The total demand for external health care services increased after the reform.  Of the 844 
services requested and filed after the reform implementation, demand for hospitalization 
decreased to 83 (9.8%), demand for laboratory investigations increased to 506 (59.9%) and 
that for radiology also increased to 255 (30.2%). Details can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 6.
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The changes are statistically significant in hospitalization, laboratory, and radiology service 
request after the reform implementation compared to before (p < 0.05). 
3. Changes in mean waiting time 
Radiology 
The total administrative waiting time for radiology investigations decreased by one day after 
the reform implementation (9.1 (5.4) after vs. 10.1 (3.1) before). The results were statistically 
significant (p<0.05). The number of days between realization and results of radiology 
investigations has also decreased after the reform (2.1 (3.3) after vs. 4.8 (6.7) before). Details 
can be seen in Table 3 and Figure 7. 
 
Laboratory 
The total administrative waiting time for laboratory investigations has decreased by one day 
and a half after the reform implementation (8.9 (6.2) after vs. 10.4 (2.9) before). The results 
were statistically significant (p<0.05). The number of days between realization and results of 
laboratory investigations has increased after the reform (1.8 (2.7) after vs. 1.4 (2.1) before). 
Details can be seen in Table 4 and Figure 8. 
 
Hospitalization 
The total administrative waiting time for hospitalization has decreased by 1.7 days after the 
reform implementation (8.2 (4.3) after vs. 9.9 (2.5) before). The results were statistically 
significant (p<0.05). The number of days between approval and admission to the hospital has 
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also decreased (29.4 (25.8) after vs. 37.1 (36.4) before). Details can be seen in Table 5 and 
Figure 9. 
 
4. Waiting Time by Prisoner’s Characteristics after Reform 
Age 
The waiting time between the medical problem and admission to the hospital was shorter for 
prisoners above 40 years of age (mean duration 23.2 days after vs. 32.0 days before), even as 
the total number of hospitalization requests has decreased after the reform for that age group 
(42 requests after vs. 57 requests before). The results were not statistically significant. Details 
can be seen in Table 6 and Figure 10. 
The waiting time between the medical problem and results of laboratory investigations has 
been noted to increase significantly for prisoners of all ages under or above 40 years of age 
as the number of laboratory investigations have increased after the reform. The results were 
statistically significant (p<0.05). Details can be seen in Table 6 and Figure 11. 
The waiting time between the medical problem and results of radiology investigations was 
shorter for prisoners above 40 years of age (mean duration 21.8 days after vs. 24.1 days 
before) while the number of radiology investigations increased after the reform for that age 
group (65 requests after vs. 45 requests before). Details can be seen in Table 6 and Figure 12. 
 
Duration of Incarceration 
The waiting time between the problem report and admission to the hospital has decreased for 
all prisoners regardless of their duration of incarceration. Further investigation showed that 
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the number of hospitalization requests has decreased more for prisoners who have been 
incarcerated for more than 4 years (28.2 days before vs. 21.2 days after) than for those 
incarcerated for less than 4 years (29.8 days before vs. 27.6 days after) (Figure 13). The 
results were statistically significant (p<0.05). Details can be seen in Table 7 and Figure 13. 
 
The waiting time between the Problem Report and results of radiology investigations has 
been noted to be shorter for prisoners of all duration of incarceration as the number of 
requests for radiology investigations has increased after the reform implementation. The 
results were not statistically significant. Details can be seen in Table 7 and Figure 14. 
 
The waiting time between the Problem Report and results of Laboratory investigations has 
been noted to increase significantly for prisoners regardless of their duration of incarceration 
as the number of requests for laboratory investigations has increased after the reform 
implementation. The results were not statistically significant. Details can be seen in Table 7 
and Figure 15.  
 
Educational Attainment 
The waiting time between the Problem Report and admission to the hospital has been noted 
to be shorter for prisoners who had received secondary or above level of education (Mean 
duration 16.2 days after vs. 35.2 days before) as the number of hospitalization requests has 
decreased (18 requests after vs. 21 requests before) for those patient prisoners after the 
reform implementation. The results were statistically significant (p<0.05). Otherwise, there 
has been noted an increase in waiting time. Details can be seen Table 8 and Figure 16. 
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The waiting time between the Problem Report and results of radiology investigations has 
been noted to be shorter for prisoners of all education level attainment. The results were 
statistically significant (p<0.05). Details can be seen in Table 8 and Figure 17. 
 
The waiting time between the Problem Report and results of laboratory investigations has 
been noted to increase for prisoners of all education level attainment. The results were not 
statistically significant. Details can be seen in Table 8 and Figure 18. 
 
Nationality 
Table 9 shows that the waiting time between the problem report and admission to the hospital 
has decreased for all prisoners regardless of their nationality. Further investigation showed 
that the number for hospitalization requests has decreased and delay has shortened more for 
non-Lebanese prisoners (28.12 days before vs. 13.8 days after) than Lebanese nationals 
(29.12 days before vs. 27.42 days after). The results were statistically significant (p<0.05). 
Details can be seen in Table 9 and Figure 19. 
 
The waiting time between the Problem Report and results of Radiology investigations has 
been noted to be shorter for all prisoners as the number of requests for Radiology 
investigations has increased after the reform implementation. Further investigation showed 
that the number for Radiology requests has increased and delay has shortened more for non 
Lebanese prisoners (32 days before vs. 18.45 days after) than Lebanese (22.10 days before 
vs. 15.34 days after). The results were statistically significant (p<0.05). Details can be seen in 
Table 9 and Figure 20. 
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The waiting time between the Problem Report and results of Laboratory investigations has 
been noted to increase significantly for all prisoners regardless of their nationality as the 
number of requests for Laboratory investigations has increased after the reform 
implementation. The results were statistically significant (p<0.05). Details can be seen in 
Table 9 and Figure 21. 
 
5. Waiting Time by ICD10 after Reform 
The study of the waiting time between the medical problem and the realization of the 
investigations or admission to the hospital by ICD10 classification revealed an increase in 
waiting time for the majority of the classes. We found statistical significance (p<0.05) for the 
following ICD10 classes: Signs and Symptoms and Abnormal clinical and laboratory 
findings, not elsewhere classified (3.3 days before vs. 7.1 days after), Diseases of the 
genitourinary system (4.6 days before vs. 7.3 days after), and Endocrine, nutritional and 
metabolic diseases (2.4 days before vs. 4.9 days after). In general, it was observed that for all 
ICD10 classifications, the number of requests has increased after the reform implementation. 
Details can be seen in Table 10. 
 
It is worth noting that the impact of the prisoner’s characteristics discussed earlier (age, 
duration of incarceration, and educational attainment) upon the waiting time is evaluated 
between the medical problems and results for laboratory and radiology requests and between 
the Problem Report and admission for hospitalization. For the ICD10 analyses, however, all 
requests (laboratory, radiology, and hospitalization) were grouped together, and the waiting 
time is studied between the Problem Report and realization/admission. 
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A breakdown of ICD10 by type of investigation was not performed for two main reasons. 
First, for the ethical purpose to protect the patient prisoner’s privacy, and second to avoid 
having groups with smaller frequencies (less than five), where meaningful means and 
standard deviations could not be calculated. Hence, our need to assemble different diagnoses 
in one group of health problems. 
6. Requests by Selected Variables 
Units of Incarceration 
The number of demand for hospitalization in Prison Unit A decreased by 42%, whereas it 
increased or remained the same in other units. The demand for laboratory and radiology 
increased in all units after the reform implementation by 88% and 76%, respectively. Details 
can be seen in Table 11 and Figure 22. 
 
Educational Attainment 
The higher demand for external health care services after the reform implementation 
persisted for patient prisoners who had received intermediate level education. Similarly, the 
demand for hospitalization remained constant for those of intermediate level but decreased 
for those who were Illiterate or had received elementary or secondary level of education. It 
increased for those above secondary education level. The results were statistically significant 
(p < 0.05) except for above secondary education level prisoners (p=0.73). 
 
The demand for laboratory increased for all prisoners of all education levels, but the results 
were not statistically significant. On the other hand, the demand for radiology increased for 
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all prisoners of all education levels, and the results were statistically significant (p < 0.05) for 
illiterate prisoners. Details can be seen in Table 12 and Figure 23. 
 
Nationality 
Twelve external health care requests were made by prisoners of non-Arabic nationalities 
prior to the implementation of the reform and 11 requests post implementation. These 
requests were removed from this part of the data analysis because of small numbers.    
The higher demand for external health care services after the reform implementation 
persisted for patient prisoners of Lebanese nationality. 
 
The demand for hospitalization decreased for prisoners of all nationalities. The results were 
statistically significant for Lebanese and other Arab nationalities except Palestinians. 
 
The demand for laboratory services increased for prisoners of all nationalities. The results 
were statistically significant for Lebanese nationals only. 
The demand for radiology has increased for prisoners of all nationalities. The results were 
not statistically significant. Details can be seen in Table 13 and Figure 24. 
 
Age 
Table 14 shows that the mean age did not vary for all types of investigations after the 




Duration of Incarceration 
The mean duration of incarceration (months) has decreased after the reform implementation 
for all types of investigations. The average period of incarceration of hospitalized prisoners 
was reduced from 63 months to 40 months. The results were statistically significant (p<0.05). 
Details can be seen in Table 15 and Figure 26. 
7. Costs 
While the volume of healthcare requests has increased, the cost has remained almost 
unchanged after the reform implementation (US$ 482,236 before versus US$ 498,939 after). 
This cost is associated with an overall demand that includes urgent and non urgent healthcare 
needs (1142 cases before vs. 1325 after). See Table 16. 
 
CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION 
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate an administrative reform that aimed at decreasing 
delays in external health care delivery to prisoners in a correctional facility in Lebanon.  The 
delay time had usually been from 2 to 4 weeks, a period perceived to be deleterious for the 
well-being of prisoners and potentially more costly due to non-timely delivery of needed 
services.  The overall impact on public health is also a consideration. It was hypothesized 
that the time for obtaining external healthcare services would be shortened, as a result of the 
intervention, to an interval of 3 to 10 days. Practically all intervening steps were revised and 
simplified, some even canceled totally.  Planning the intervention was, expectedly, a long 
and slow process of ten months, as authorizations to proceed had to go up and down the 
chains of command of a variety of departments within the ISF administration before being 
presented to a final agreement from the General Director.  Nevertheless, once this agreement 
was secured, the implementation advanced rapidly.  
 
This relatively small reform nevertheless carries major implications, first and most 
immediately on the welfare of prisoners and the professional satisfaction of their caregivers 
who now could see their requests for care filled within a reasonable period of time.  Other 
implications are system-wise.  Planned administrative reforms are rare in Lebanon, and when 
they are initiated, they often fail to reach their goals.  This resistance to change is even more 
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pronounced in military structures, such as the ISF administration in charge of overseeing 
prisons in Lebanon.  These structures are notoriously more rigid than those in the civilian 
public administration, and the chain of command is strictly adhered to, which may 
discourage any budding attempt at change. That the command approved and supported this 
particular change is a clear indication of a new direction decided by the ISF in favor of 
improving the living conditions of prisoners and upholding their basic human rights.  This 
was often articulated in recent years, in particular by the Minister of Interior whose 
administration oversees the ISF. The support for a needed change in health care delivery to 
prisoners also emanated from the International Committee of the Red Cross report that was 
submitted to the Minister of Interior around the time this reform was being implemented. 
 
The most determining step targeted to reduce the delay to care services was the waiting time 
from the moment a care request for a medical problem is made to the moment an 
administrative approval is obtained.  The new policy implementation has delegated the 
responsibility of requesting fund allocation for external medical services to the polyclinic, 
whereas it used to be delegated to the prison’s administration.  Overall, the intervention 
yielded the expected results, as indicated by monitoring mean delays in the nine months 
following implementation and comparing them with those of nine months preceding it.  The 
intervention yielded shortened delays incrementally as several obstacles were being resolved, 
such as: 
1)  A lack of experience in performing the new administrative procedure at the beginning of 
the implementation,  
2)  An increase in the workload because of the increase in the number of external requests;  
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3)  The unavailability of the Director of the Polyclinic to sign the Problem Report due to 
competing responsibilities.  
 
While generally successful in shortening delays, this intervention did not achieve the same 
magnitude of success across all types of healthcare needs.  Delays were shortened primarily 
for obtaining radiology test results, but not for laboratory test results or for hospitalization 
requests. For radiology, the shortening may be explained by the increase in the number of 
requests for radiology investigations, which accompanied the changing attitudes of jail 
physicians, now reassured that care will be provided in time.   This increase meant that the 
number of trips made by the prison’s policemen to transport prisoners to external health care 
providers also increased.  Thus, the opportunity arises for the policeman to pick up the results 
of previous tests while waiting for the procedure to be carried out.   For laboratory tests, 
delays are generally an inherent part of the technical procedures, and are therefore less 
amenable to structural or organizational modifications. A change in the quality of laboratory 
tests, now involving more sophisticated investigations, is also likely to keep the delay time as 
long if not longer than before the intervention.  In the past, physicians, knowing that care is 
inevitably delayed, preferred to request a hospitalization in which any such sophisticated 
laboratory investigations could be performed as a package along with immediately needed 
care.  Now that they are reassured that waiting time to hospitalization is reduced, such 
investigations are being requested normally on an outpatient basis.  This is further evidenced 
by the significant decrease in hospitalization rates post-implementation compared to those 
pre-implementation.  This finding invalidates the original hypothesis, and can be considered 
as an unexpected yet welcome consequence of the reform.   
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Overall, the reform did not affect the delay time between a request for hospitalization and the 
realization of that request.  This is very likely due to administrative learning time which 
would be alleviated over time as discussed above.  However, a careful analysis of prisoners 
characteristics indicates that the absence of change in delay time is not true across all strata.  
For example, delay times decreased significantly for older prisoners compared to younger 
ones. Older prisoners are prone to more severe or chronic diseases requiring hospitalization.  
As competition for limited access to hospital beds decreased with reduced rates of un-needed 
hospitalizations, those who genuinely need hospital care were thus more likely to obtain it in 
short delays. Younger prisoners, who are generally more physically active, are more 
susceptible to musculoskeletal injuries that require radiology investigation, and they were 
now more likely to obtain it than before the intervention.  Inmates with longer incarceration 
periods benefited more from hospitalization delay reductions than inmates with shorter 
period of incarceration, but this fact is very likely associated with the confounding effect of 
age, itself associated with longer incarceration periods.  There were no differences in delay 
decreases by education, nationality or categories of diseases.  
 
The improvement in the administrative processing time has encouraged sick prisoners to seek 
medical attention with the hope of obtaining timely care.  Overall demand for external care 
thus almost doubled for various investigations, while decreasing for hospitalizations as 
discussed above.  There was no evidence of discrimination based on nationality, educational 
attainment, age, or duration of incarceration.  Primary care problems are now attended at 
earlier stages, further negating the need for hospitalizations after the case has deteriorated.  
The improvement in health outcomes for prisoners is matched by 11% decrease in overall 
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costs of care per case in the nine months after implementation.  Thus, while overall costs of 
care have remained largely at the same level, money is being used more effectively (cost per 
case) and efficiently (health outcomes per cost). 
CHAPTER V: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS  
 
Plan for Change 
The implementation of the administrative reform at the Roumieh correctional facility has 
shortened the delay for external health care delivery to prisoners, thus, improving one aspect 
in the health status of prisoners: the timely delivery of needed health services. However, this 
reform is only a small step in a venture that must be undertaken to promote good practices in 
delivering health care services to prisoners. We suggest the following provisional plans for 
change based upon our observations of the ISF administration and operation of health care 
services and their timely delivery in prison and based on best practices of health care delivery 
in prisons. These recommendations constitute solutions toward the improvement of health 
delivery and management in prisons. The implementation of these recommendations requires 
leadership skills and principles that would translate into better practices of health care 
services in prisons. 
 
For the short term (1-3 years): 
1. ISF operation of health care delivery in prisons. 




3. ISF Collaboration with other governmental ministries. 
4. ISF Cooperation with Local and International Institutions and Organizations. 
5. Initiatives with regional (Middle East and North Africa) ministries in charge of health 
in prisons. 
For the long term (> 3 years): 
6. Centralization of health services through an Independent Central Correctional 
Administration who reports directly to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). 
 
1. ISF Operation of Health Care Delivery in Prisons 
a. Establish an office for Health in Prisons at the Department of Health at the ISF. 
This office has the responsibility to deal with health related issues for prisoners in 
all Lebanese Prisons. The presence of such an office will enable the ISF in 
determining the cost of health services offered to prisoners and in planning 
accordingly its budget reserved for health care expenditures in prisons. This office 
will also serve as the source of information for the ISF regarding the health status of 
prisoners, the types of medications and their costs, and the types of health care 
services offered in every prison and their costs. Furthermore, this office will build 
the databases needed for the ISF to track the incidence and frequency of diseases in 
every prison in order to prepare the appropriate awareness programs for promoting 
health, disease prevention, and disease management in the prison system and 
allocate the necessary budget for the realization of these programs. In addition, if an 
electronic database will be available in every Polyclinic in every prison, an office 
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for Health in Prisons will profit from it to conduct internal and external audits on 
the prison system in Lebanon to assess critically whether health care services 
delivered to prisoners are adequate or not.  
b. Assign a specific budget for health in Prisons. This budget will cover 
hospitalization fees, specialized consultations, Laboratory and radiology 
investigations, as well as medical supplies. This budget will allow the Polyclinic to 
set its expenditure health priorities. In addition, this budget allocated by the 
Government to the Prisons should be different from that allotted to the ISF 
personnel on health. 
c. Increase in the number of beds reserved for patient prisoners in public and private 
hospitals. Although there is an agreement between the ISF and some hospitals upon 
a pre-determined number of beds, the director of the Polyclinic has requested an 
increase in the total number of beds at these hospitals. Furthermore, the director of 
the Polyclinic has requested from the ISF to establish newer agreements with 
nearby hospitals to increase the overall number of beds allocated for prisoners. 
d. Increase in the number of patrols (ISF policemen and vehicles that work under the 
jurisdiction of the Prison Administration or ―Gendarmerie‖ but not at the 
Polyclinic) that are solely committed for the secure transport of patient prisoners 
outside Roumieh premises.  
e. Human Resources at the Polyclinic. The ISF should appoint qualified and trained 
personnel at the Polyclinic with specific incentives for working within the context 
of a correctional facility. The current medical and paramedical personnel 
(policemen) are neither qualified nor appropriate in number to provide patient 
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prisoners with adequate health care. This has led to the use of the prisoners 
themselves as paramedical (administrative) support staff. Furthermore, there is a 
high turnover in the staff working at the polyclinic due to the restraints and security 
measures taken when working in a prison setting. Thus, the Director of the 
Polyclinic has contacted the Lebanese Red Cross to train the policemen on First Aid 
Services and on nursing services to assist in aiding the staff at the Polyclinic in 
Roumieh and in other Lebanese prisons. Moreover, the ISF need to consider the 
appointment at the Polyclinic of a qualified administrative staff responsible for fund 
allocation and securing appointments for appropriate health care services at external 
health care institutions. This will prevent the use of prisoners as a support staff at 
the Polyclinic. Qualified personnel will also be able to efficiently communicate 
with the patrol services to ensure a timely transfer of patient prisoners.  
f. Appointment of an Assistant to the Director of the Polyclinic. Different tasks are 
assigned to the polyclinic’s director outside the correctional facility, thereby, 
delaying the process of signing the Problem Report, and as a consequence, delaying 
the external health care request. Thus, the appointment of an assistant to the 
Director could prevent a delay in health care delivery. 
g. Implement the Electronic Medical Record Database. Each prisoner should have an 
electronic medical record regardless of whether he is sick or not. This would also 
include assigning a unique Medical Identifier for each prisoner for continuity of 
care. At the present time, a paper-medical record is present only for prisoners who 
have a medical claim, take prescription drugs, have been hospitalized, or have 
requested or undergone laboratory and radiology investigations. The lack of 
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personnel at the Polyclinic has prevented an electronic set up in the form of a 
Database for the paper medical record currently available and the opening of an 
electronic medical file for each prisoner upon incarceration at Roumieh. Therefore, 
the necessity to activate the IT network that was installed at the polyclinic in 2005 
without ever being used due to a lack in human resources. An electronic database 
will allow the Polyclinic the possibility to collect and study epidemiologic data in 
order to evaluate a disease and it’s spreading among prisoners, thus, providing the 
decision makers to take the appropriate measures. 
h. Establishment of an infirmary within each unit of incarceration in the Correctional 
Facility. Each unit of incarceration will have an infirmary in which medical and 
dental care is provided to patient prisoners. Currently, patient prisoners are 
transferred from their units of incarceration to the Polyclinic accompanied by 
policemen. When policemen are unavailable, patient prisoners miss their medical 
appointments. Therefore, the presence of the infirmary will avoid the transfer of 
patients from one incarceration unit to another, thus, by passing the need to deal 
with security issues and leading to a faster delivery of care. 
i. Review of mandatory testing (HIV, VDRL, HBAgS, and PPD) of sentenced 
individuals upon incarceration at Roumieh. The mandatory testing can be looked 
upon from several perspectives. From a human right perspective, the prisoner has 
the right to refuse mandatory testing. If it is the case, he will be in solitary 
confinement because of the fear of spreading the virus to other prisoners. However, 
in an already overcrowded facility, the prison administration does not allow solitary 
confinement due to a lack of space. Furthermore, mandatory testing of a new 
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prisoner is providing a false sense of security to some inmates who could engage in 
a risky behavior with the new prisoner. I suggest voluntary testing for new prisoners 
accompanied by continuous awareness campaigns about the transmission of STDs. 
In fact, The Director of the Polyclinic is a member of a Task force that was initiated 
by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to solicit funds from 
Kent University (UK) to spread awareness about sexually transmitted diseases 
(STDs) and conduct workshops in 14 prisons in Lebanon to promote voluntary 
counseling and testing. 
j. Develop Policies of good practice and quality of health care throughout the prison. 
The policy main objective is to address the issues related to delay in the healthcare 
services delivery through devising concise procedures and/or regulations for the 
following: 
 Timely delivery of health care services to prisoners based on a service level 
mechanism that includes categorization and prioritization of prisoners’ health 
needs or conditions, notification and escalation process for delivery of 
healthcare. The policy should include time standards for transfers for out-of-
prison referrals based on clinical treatment guidelines and procedures the 
prison should follow for certain health conditions. 
 Standardize and streamline the process of health care delivery by instilling 
governance, policies and procedures and performance indicators. 
 Set measures and procedures for accountability and liability for health care 
delivery issues. 
The policy should be implemented and communicated at every stage of the medical 
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intervention process in order to achieve high level and timely quality delivery of 
healthcare services to prisoners at the Central Prison of Roumieh in Lebanon. 
 
2. Initiatives of Collaboration with other governmental ministries 
a. Build a task force between the ISF and the MOH to establish the necessary national 
guidelines concerning the investigation, diagnosis, treatment, support, and care of 
TB, Hepatitis, and AIDS in prisons. The Ministry of Health (MOH) should be 
involved in the health status of prisoners taking into account Health in Prison when 
building its National Programs (TB, Hepatitis, and AIDS) to tailor these programs 
to fit the needs of prisons.  
b. Develop and implement several ―Memorandums of understanding‖ among 
governmental agencies, such as ministries, to involve them in the prison’s activities. 
The Ministries of Health, Social Affairs, Education, and Industry must share the 
responsibility of rehabilitating the prisoner within the prison premises and before 
sending them back to the community. The ministries will be involved via providing 
health awareness campaigns within the prison (National Tuberculosis, National 
Hepatitis, and National Aids Programs), counseling the family of the prisoners, 
offering educational programs and degrees, and establishing industrial workshops 
and periodical apprenticeships that would allow the prisoner to secure at least a 
minimum wage paying job within the prison premises and once outside. These 
activities would allow the prisoners to make better use of their time and to feel 
productive instead of being left idle, a way by which the majority of prisoners 
would acquire the habit of substance abuse. Then, the vicious circle of addiction 
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and offenses starts during which the prisoner goes in and out of the correctional 
facility. This step will also assist the ISF in its effort to be independent upon local 
NGO’s activities that have proven to be inefficient within prisons  
c. Decrease the overcrowding in prisons. Awareness campaigns about the 
overcrowding in prisons and the deterioration of the health conditions in prisons has 
prompted the government to allocate funds for the building of new regional prisons 
in the North and South of the country. A new prison has also been inaugurated by 
the minister of Interior in Zahle on April 28, 2010. Prison overcrowding can be also 
alleviated by enhancing the court sentencing rate for arrested individuals and the 
repatriation of illegal immigrants upon serving their sentences. 
3. ISF Cooperation with Academic Institutions 
The author was closely working on the writing of a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the ISF and administrators at Medical and Public Health Schools of 
several Lebanese Universities (Medical Schools and Health Policy and Management 
Departments at the Lebanese University, American University of Beirut, and Saint 
Joseph University) to put in place a process by which residents could come to the 
Polyclinic at Roumieh to mainly assist in the delivery of medical services according 
to a pre-set schedule and prolong the consultation time at the Polyclinic in order to 
allow a greater number of prisoners to benefit from the health services and to train the 
medical and paramedical staff. Moreover, university medical centers could organize 
conferences within a context of continuous medical education (CME) for the medical 
and paramedical staff in order to be trained periodically. Cooperation with academia 
may also include researchers from Health Policy and Management Departments to 
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audit the current administrative health system at Roumieh in order to provide 
solutions that may serve as the basis for drafting policies to improve the overall health 
care delivery. Once the MOU is signed between the Universities and ISF, the 
Ministry of Interior that oversees that ISF will request from the Ministry of Justice to 
issue a clearance allowing medical residents and researchers from the Health Policy 
and Management Departments to enter Roumieh premises. See Appendix 2 for the 
plan to call involved organizations to action. 
 
4. ISF Cooperation with Local and International Institutions and Organizations 
a. Re-define the relation between ISF and local NGOs. A rivalry between local NGOs 
is observed in their offering of health services to prisoners at Roumieh. Each local 
NGO is attempting to take over the health services away from another, and the ISF 
has failed to exert its role as the coordinator or the auditor of the activities of these 
NGOs. In fact, a local NGO that applies to work within Roumieh takes an ISF 
approval without any prior submission of its agenda. I suggest that the ISF takes 
over completely the health services of prisoners, since it is its responsibility. 
Furthermore, the local NGOs are not performing roles that the ISF can’t undertake. 
The ISF can request from local NGOs to present their perspectives on health care 
delivery and to serve as advocates for good health in prisons by their ability to reach 
the community at large via their campaigns and media access. Moreover, the ISF 
could establish a task force on health in prisons in which local NGOs can be active 
participants.   
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b. Cooperation with international organizations. The Director of the Polyclinic has 
initiated the contact with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) via 
the ICRC Delegation after several discussions upon the administrative problems 
relating to health delivery and the lack of human resources in health care in the 
Lebanese prisons. Then, the ICRC sent an expert to assess the health situation and 
its management in the three largest (Roumieh, Tripoli, Zahle), and three small 
(Nabatieh, Jeb Jannine and Tripoli prison for women) prisons in Lebanon between 
October and November 2009. The Committee presented its report in a round table 
on April 23, 2010 to the ISF stakeholders. Refer to Appendix 3. The ICRC 
cooperation is highly recommended because of its international expertise in health 
assessment and management in prisons throughout the world, and its credibility and 
ability to grant support for hiring medical and paramedical staff.  
5. Initiatives with Regional (Middles Eastern and North African) Ministries in 
Charge of Health in Prisons 
The organization of yearly conferences on health care in prisons in Lebanon, and the 
Middle East, and North Africa (MENA) region, for setting forth recommendations and 
establishing standards for health delivery in prison. The first conference on health in 
prisons took place on November 8-10, 2008. Another regional conference is currently 
under preparation to take place in the second quarter of 2011. I suggest the 
establishment of a committee that oversees the implementation of the 
recommendations. This committee should include governmental administrative bodies 
directly attached to prisons and medical bodies that operate within the prison premises. 
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6. Policy Strategy for Centralization of Health Services 
Transfer the responsibility of the prisons back to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). This 
responsibility was delegated to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) temporarily in February 
11, 1949 (Decree Number 14310) and it has remained as such since.  This is despite a 
decree (Number 17315) that was issued on August 28, 1964 to establish an 
―Administration of Prisons‖ unit that is directly linked to the MOJ. Moreover, there is a 
five year project financed by the UNODC to transfer the responsibility of prisons back 
to the MOJ. See Appendix 4 for the policy advocacy. 
 
Limitations of the Change Plan 
1. Resistance to change: Resistance by those who want to protect their self interest or 
afraid to lose status and power is expected. The culture and system dynamics at the 
ISF (in governmental institutions in general) discourage any attempt for change.  
Acknowledgement of the reasons behind the resistance to change and establishing the 
sense of urgency to enforce and implement the change is required. 
2. Length of time for change to take effect: Administrative reforms take a long time to 
be initiated or be in effect. Most policies require laws to be in effect and be passed by 
the Council of Ministers; even hiring civilian resources to work for the polyclinic 
requires the Council of Ministers’ approval due to public budget allocation. Therefore 
any sort of change requires time for it to be in effect. 
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3. Lebanese government budget deficit: The Lebanese government is in deficit. 
Financial and budget allocation is very thoroughly thought out, and often the budget 
allocation itself undergoes all sort of political pressures and budget cuts. 
4. ISF and MOJ not finding common ground: No agreement is reached to handover or 
transition the responsibility of prison administration. ISF is requesting a full transfer 
of responsibility; on the other hand, MOJ is not ready to handle the prison health 
responsibility due to lack of the appropriate internal capabilities. 
 
Limitations of this Study 
The present work represents the first account of a study of external health care delivery to 
patient prisoners in a Lebanese Correctional Facility.  A literature review shows to date a 
record of only two publications performed in Lebanese Prisons
1, 2
. Thus, there is a lack of 
information about the background of the specific environment where we are conducting our 
research work.  
 
The idea of a reform that aims to decrease the delay in external health care delivery to 
prisoners was initially met with resistance by several parties. This resistance was manifested 
first by a strong reluctance to listen to the idea or attempt to understand the purpose of the 
reform for almost a 10-month-period of time by the Administrative Affairs Section at the 
Internal Security Forces (ISF). A discussion about the aims of the reform was conducted in 




Furthermore, the author has conducted at least 6 visits to the offices of the staff at the 
Administrative Affairs Section during which we have also discussed the reform. Their 
rationale was the need for every detail about the reform to ensure whether this reform is in 
accordance with or contradicts the Rules and Regulations that govern the health care delivery 
to prisoners not only at Roumieh but also at all correctional facilities in Lebanon.  
The reform was met by resistance from the staff at the polyclinic who felt that the reform 
implementation will impose upon them a workload and additional responsibilities. The prison 
policemen felt that the reform implementation will take away from their power in the 
structure of duties at Roumieh. 
 
Human resources at Roumieh are also one of the limitations of this study. Before the 
implementation of the reform, there were three policemen at Roumieh that were responsible 
for writing and following up the requests for fund allocation for prisoners in all the units (A, 
B, C, and D) at Roumieh. After the implementation of the reform, one policeman in the 
polyclinic remained in charge of requesting fund allocation (approval) for an external health 
care service. The observed increase in the number of external health care requests has 
become accompanied with an increased work load upon the single policeman (down from 
three) assigned to the polyclinic.   
 
Policemen assigned as convoy staff to transport the patients’ prisoners outside the Roumieh 
Correctional Facility to the external health care provider contributed to the limitation of the 
administrative reform. Any delay in the transportation convoy of the patient prisoner may 
translate into a delay in the realization of the purpose of the reform.  
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The lack of availability of hospital beds allocated to patient prisoners constitutes a limitation 
as well. The limited number of available hospital beds has led in some instances to a waiting 
list for non-urgent surgical cases. This situation has delayed the realization of the requested 
external surgical procedure and may consequently have contributed to the possible 
deterioration of the patient’s health status.  
 
The environment in which the study is conducted is the Roumieh Correctional Facility, the 
largest prison in Lebanon. Several factors related to security issues have an impact on the 
implementation of the reform such as provision for convoys to transport patient prisoners and 
hospital reluctance to accept patient prisoners unless security measures are taken inside and 
outside the hospital premises.  
 
Recommendations for Policy Changes  
Upon the study of the external health care delivery to prisoners in a Lebanese Correctional 
Facility prior to implementation of a new reform that aims to decrease the delays in external 
health care delivery, the author suggests the following future policy changes:  
1. Develop a policy for requesting the visits of medical specialists to the Roumieh 
facility. These visits would better serve prisoners if not performed on a voluntary 
basis. In fact, previous volunteering experiences by physicians have proven to be not 
useful, because of a lack of a regularly scheduled visit time, a short consultation time 
with prisoners, and a very long waiting list by prisoners. This policy should consider 
paying medical specialists premiums per service to serve as an incentive for them to 
come regularly and on time and consult as much as possible with a good number of 
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sick prisoners. These factors would lead to a decrease in waiting time for health care 
delivery to prisoners. Furthermore, this policy would allow a better delivery of health 
care because it eliminates the burdens of patient prisoners postponing or missing 
medical consultations for lack of security convoys to transport them to external health 
care providers.  
Once and if this policy would be applied, there will not be an extra expenditure 
imposed on the ISF administration, because the administrative paper work would be 
the same. The only difference is that the external health care provider would be 
coming to the Prison to service patient prisoners instead of prisoners being 
transported out of the facility to seek external medical care. 
 
Develop a policy to send all patient prisoners to external health care providers as urgent 
cases and to request fund allocation for rendered medical services at a later time.   
2. Explore and work upon the possibility to install a radiology machine inside the 
Polyclinic. If this action is realized, there will be no necessity to transport patient 
prisoners outside the prison facility to undergo radiology investigation, thereby, 
avoiding any time delay in health care delivery. Moreover, this possibility could be 
extended to the establishment of a phlebotomy team within the correctional facility to 
draw blood for laboratory investigations. Therefore, patients will be transported to 




3. Develop an urgent plan to increase the current number of beds allocated for patient 
prisoners in hospitals. Hospitals are reluctant to admit patient prisoners because of 
security implications. A series of security measures have to be set once prisoners are 
in hospitals to prevent them from escaping, causing resistance from hospitals to admit 
such patients. 
Develop a policy to significantly increase the number of convoys committed to transport 
patient prisoners outside the facility to decrease the waiting time once an external health 
care service is requested. This policy would also prevent the act of postponing or missing 
the external medical appointment, and most importantly the act of delaying the 
transportation of urgent cases outside the facility. 
Currently mental health services are provided in a consultation form. Mental health 
professionals provide their counseling services on a voluntary basis, hence the need to 
establish a mental health unit that would provide counseling for inmates and treatment for 
mental health disabilities. 
 
CHAPTER VI: Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate and assess an intervention that aims to decrease 
delays in external health care delivery to prisoners in Roumieh, a correctional facility in 
Lebanon. This reform that intended in its overall objective to improve health care delivery to 
prisoners has encountered obstacles and limitations, of which some were overcome while 
others are under work, and the remaining ones are probably not to be solved. 
The multiplicity of layers that was present at the ISF to approve the reform, the reluctance of 
several parties within the ISF and the staff at the Polyclinic to listen to the idea of the reform 
or understand its purpose, and the scarcity of human resources at Roumieh have represented 
the major obstacle/limitation factors in the launching of the reform. Furthermore, the lack of 
availability of hospital beds and the reluctance of hospitals to admit patient prisoners, and the 
security measures related to the transport of patient prisoners constituted limitation factors as 
well.  
 
The reform has overcome the reluctance of the ISF to its approval, and by the time the reform 
was implemented, the ISF was supportive of the efforts taken to implement it. Moreover, the 
lack of enthusiasm shown by the staff of the Polyclinic at the start of the reform has 
dissipated by the implementation phase, because it became a part of their daily work. 
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Currently, the security issues related to the transport of prisoners to external health facilities 
are under work, and the allocation of a larger number of beds for patient prisoners as well as 
the willingness of hospitals to admit them remain factors that need to be resolved.  
 
Leadership skills were needed to overcome the obstacles that faced the approval of the 
reform.  The objective of the reform was clearly defined, and its successful implementation 
required a cooperative effort between the Polyclinic administration and the Prison 
Administration. The polyclinic’s director mediator style between the two parties was 
essential to the successful execution of this cooperative joint venture. The reform has reached 
its goal in delivering better health care delivery to prisoners, and the staff at the Polyclinic 
has now acquired a behavior in line with the values needed to deliver quality care to 
prisoners.   
 
The reform has yielded a number of good indicators shown by the decrease in the waiting 
time required for external health care delivery and the increased number of served prison 
population in its implementation phase. The number of patient prisoners who benefited from 
radiology and laboratory tests has increased, and consequently the number of hospitalized 
patient prisoners was decreased. Therefore, the success of this reform could be applied to all 
prisons in Lebanon and extended to other sectors at the ISF specifically as well as other 





The reform has had good long-term outcomes from financial, health, and human rights and 
national reputation perspectives. After the implementation of the reform, there was an 11% 
decrease in health care spending per case, an improvement in health care delivery manifested 
by the decrease in the number of hospitalization cases due to the appropriate follow up of 
patient prisoners. Moreover, the human right of prisoners for a timely health care delivery 
was achieved leading to a good national reputation for the prison system in Lebanon, once 




Table 1. Characteristics of prisoners requesting external health care in Roumieh correctional 
facility  
(November 2007- May 2009) (N= 943 prisoners)* 
 
Variable n % 
Units of Incarceration 
A (Sentenced) 403 31 
B (Arrested) 418 32 
C (Mixed) 288 22 
D (Arrested) 197 15 
Educational Attainment 
Illiterate 236 18 
Elementery 260 20 
Intermediate 521 40 
Secondary 165 13 
Above Secondary 124 10 
Nationality 
Lebanese 1018 78 
Palestinian 105 8 
Other Arab Countries 160 12 
Mean age in years (SD) 39.4 (12.2) 
Duration of Incarceration in months 
(SD) 
44.8 (34.4) 





Table 2. Distribution of external non urgent health care requests by type of investigation 
before and after the reform implementation in Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Distribution of external non urgent health care requests by investigation type (n, %) 
 Before 
(Nov 2007-Jul 2008) 
After 
(Sep 2008-May 2009) 
Total p-value 
Hospitalization 99 (21.4) 83 (9.8) 182 (14.0) <0.01 
Laboratory 247 (53.4) 506 (59.9) 753 (58.0) 0.02 
Radiology 116 (25.1) 255 (30.2) 371 (28.0) 0.05 
Total 462 (100.0) 844 (100.0) 1306 (100.0) - 
*Reform implementation started August 2008 
 
 
Table 3. Waiting Time between problem report and results for Radiology Investigations 
before and after reform implementation in Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Radiology 





Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p-value 
Problem Report to Administrative 
Request  
3.2 (1.6) 4.5 (4.9) <0.01 
Administrative Request to 
Approval 
6.9 (2.8) 4.7 (1.7) <0.01 
Total from Initiation of requests to 
Approval 
10.1 (3.1) 9.1 (5.4) 0.039 
Realization to Result** 4.8 (6.7) 2.1 (3.3) <0.01 
*   Reform implementation started August 2008 





Table 4. Waiting Time between problem report and results for Laboratory Investigations 
before and after reform implementation in Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Laboratory 





Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p-value 
Problem Report to Administrative 
Request  
3.2 (1.8) 4.4 (5.6) <0.01 
Administrative Request to 
Approval 
7.1 (2.8) 4.5 (2.1) <0.01 
Total from Initiation of Requests 
to Approval 
10.4 (2.9) 8.9 (6.2) <0.01 
Realization to Result** 1.4 (2.1) 1.8 (2.7) 0.008 
*   Reform implementation started August 2008 
** Interval between the laboratory realization and the result reporting 
 
Table 5. Waiting Time between problem report and approval for Hospitalization before and 
after reform implementation in Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Hospitalization 





Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p-value 
Problem Report to Administrative 
Request  
3.1 (1.8) 3.8 (3.5) 0.081 
Administrative Request to 
Approval 
6.8 (2.3) 4.5 (1.8) <0.01 
Total from Initiation of requests to 
Approval 
9.9 (2.5) 8.2 (4.3) 0.004 
Approval to Admission** 37.1 (36.4) 29.4 (25.8) 0.199 
*   Reform implementation started August 2008 
** Delay time for cases which remained not urgent (58 before, 54 after) between approval 




Table 6. Waiting Time between a problem report and admission/result by Age before and 
after reform implementation in Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Age (Years) 
 Duration in Days  
Variable Before After  
 n Mean(SD) n Mean(SD) p-value 
Hospitalization      
[20- 40]  42 24.8 (22.7) 41 28.4 (28.6) 0.52 
[> 40]  57 32.0 (41.9) 42 23.2 (28.2) 0.24 
Laboratory      
[20- 40]  138 4.2 (5.8) 285 8.3 (6.3) <0.01 
[> 40]  108 3.2 (2.8) 218 8.2 (6.1) <0.01 
Radiology      
[20- 40]  71 30.5 (48.0) 168 20.5 (20.4) 0.02 
[> 40]  45 24.1 (18.1) 65 21.8 (18.7) 0.51 
*Reform implementation started August 2008 
 
Table 7. Waiting Time between a problem report and admission/result by Duration of 
Incarceration before and after reform implementation in Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Duration of incarceration 
Duration in Days 
 Before After  
Variable n Mean(SD) n Mean(SD) p-value 
Hospitalization      
[< 4 years]  47 29.8 (37.7) 60 27.6 (31.2) 0.74 
[≥ 4 years]  52 28.2 (33.0) 23 21.2 (19.1) 0.35 
Laboratory      
[< 4 years]  161 3.8 (5.3) 366 8.4 (6.8) <0.01 
[≥ 4 years]  85 3.7 (3.4) 138 7.8 (4.3) <0.01 
Radiology      
[< 4 years]  80 29.0 (45.5) 184 19.8 (19.8) 0.02 
[≥ 4 years]  36 26.0 (19.3) 49 24.9 (20.2) 0.80 





Table 8. Waiting Time between a problem report and admission/result by Education Level 
before and after reform implementation in Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Educational Attainment 
Duration In Days 
Variable Before After  
 n Mean(SD) n Mean(SD) p-value 
Hospitalization      
Elementary or Less  44 24.7 (38.4) 31 25.4 (23.7) 0.93 
Intermediate  34 30.5 (31.9) 34 31.2 (35.6) 0.93 
Secondary or above  21 35.2 (33.2) 18 16.2 (16.7) 0.03 
Laboratory      
Elementary or Less  83 3.4 (2.9) 176 16.2 (16.7) <0.01 
Intermediate  102 3.7 (6.0) 206 7.6 (5.0) <0.01 
Secondary or above  61 4.3 (4.3) 122 9.0 (6.0) <0.01 
Radiology      
Elementary or Less  40 23.7 (22.0) 108 21.1 (22.1) 0.52 
Intermediate  52 31.0 (53.7) 88 19.5 (18.7) 0.07 
Secondary or above  24 28.9 (20.8) 37 23.6 (16.1) 0.28 
*Reform implementation started August 2008 
 
Table 9 Waiting Time between a problem report and admission/result by Nationality before 
and after reform implementation in Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Nationality 
Duration in Days 
 Before After  
Variable n Mean(SD) n Mean(SD) p-value 
Hospitalization      
Lebanese  75 29.12 (31.43) 73 27.42 (29.09) < 0.01 
Non Lebanese 24 28.12 (45.52) 10 13.8 (19.62) < 0.01 
Laboratory      
Lebanese 184 3.4 (297) 395 8.27 (6.44) < 0.01 
Non Lebanese  63 4.79 (7.86) 111 7.68 (5.60) < 0.01 
Radiology      
Lebanese 84 22.10 (16.67) 193 15.34 (41.17) < 0.01 
Non Lebanese  32 32 (23.16) 62 18.45 (42.36) < 0.01 
*Reform implementation started August 2008 
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Table 10. Waiting Time Between a Medical Visit Leading to an External Health Care 
Request (Laboratory, Radiology, or Hospitalization) and Realization of the request by 
ICD 10 Class before and after reform implementation in Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Duration in Days 





Mean (SD) p-value 
Signs & Symptoms & 
Abnormal clinical & 
laboratory findings, not 
elsewhere classified  
 
 








Injury, poisoning & other 
consequences of external 
causes  
 
51 19.7 (19) 
 
 




Diseases of the 
genitourinary system   
 
48 4.6 (7.6) 
 
107 7.3 (7.6) 0.040 
Diseases of the 
musculoskeletal system and 
connective tissues  
 
41 12.7 (15.7) 
 
 




Diseases of the circulatory 
system   
 
39 5.1 (12.1) 
 
34 9.5 (18.1) 0.207 
Diseases of the respiratory 
system   
 
24 29.9 (78.8) 
 
67 14.8 (15.1) 0.135 
Endocrine, nutritional and 
metabolic Diseases  
 
21 2.4 (2.2) 
 
52 4.9 (3.7) 0.005 
Other Systems 42 5.5 (8.8) 57 11.2 (17.9) 0.065 
Total 355  743   





Table 11. Requests for external care by facility before and after reform implementation in 
Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Units of Incarceration 
Variable Before After p-value 
A (Sentenced) (%) 
Hospitalization 49 (36.0) 28 (10.5) <0.01 
Laboratory 51 (37.5) 148 (55.4) <0.01 
Radiology 36 (26.5) 91 (34.1) 0.11 
Total 136 (100.0) 267 (100.0) - 
B (Arrested) (%) 
Hospitalization 26 (17.0) 28 (10.6) 0.05 
Laboratory 89 (58.2) 170 (64.1) 0.22 
Radiology 38 (24.8) 67 (25.3) 0.91 
Total 153 (100.0) 265 (100.0) - 
C (Juvenile and Arrested) (%) 
Hospitalization 15 (15.5) 18 (9.5) 0.12 
Laboratory 61 (62.9) 116 (60.7) 0.72 
Radiology 21 (21.6) 57 (29.8) 0.13 
Total 97 (100.0) 191 (100.0) - 
D (Arrested) (%) 
Hospitalization 9 (11.9) 9 (7.4) 0.44 
Laboratory 46 (60.5) 72 (59.5) 0.38 
Radiology 21 (27.6) 40 (33.1) 0.17 
Total 76 (100.0) 121 (100.0) - 
Hospitalization 99 (21.4) 83 (9.8) <0.01 
Laboratory 247 (53.4) 506 (59.9) 0.02 
Radiology 116 (25.1) 255 (30.2) 0.05 
Total 462 (100.0) 844 (100.0) - 




Table 12. Requests for external care by educational attainment before and after reform 
implementation in Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Educational Attainment 
Variable Before After p-value 
Illiterate (%) 
Hospitalization 20 (26.3) 13 (8.1) <0.01 
Laboratory 39 (51.3) 86 (53.8) 0.72 
Radiology 17 (22.4) 61(38.1) 0.01 
Total 76 (100.0) 160 (100.0) - 
Elementary (%) 
Hospitalization 24 (26.4) 18 (10.7) <0.01 
Laboratory 44 (48.3) 91 (53.8) 0.39 
Radiology 23 (25.3) 60 (35.5) 0.09 
Total 91 (100.0) 169 (100.0) - 
Intermediate (%) 
Hospitalization 34 (18.0) 34 (10.3) 0.01 
Laboratory 103 (54.5) 206 (62.0) 0.09 
Radiology 52 (27.5) 92 (27.7) 0.96 
Total 189 (100.0) 332 (100.0) - 
Secondary (%) 
Hospitalization 16 (26.7) 11 (10.5) <0.01 
Laboratory 35 (58.3) 71 (67.6) 0.23 
Radiology 9 (15.0) 23 (21.9) 0.28 
Total 60 (100.0) 105 (100.0) - 
Above Secondary (%) 
Hospitalization 5 (10.9) 7 (9.0) 0.73 
Laboratory 26 (56.5) 52 (66.7) 0.25 
Radiology 15 (32.6) 19 (24.3) 0.31 
Total 46 (100.0) 78 (100.0) - 
Hospitalization 99 (21.4) 83 (9.8) <0.01 
Laboratory 247 (53.4) 506 (59.9) 0.02 
Radiology 116 (25.1) 255 (30.2) 0.05 
Total 462 (100.0) 844 (100.0) - 






Table 13. Requests by nationality before and after reform implementation in Roumieh 
correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Nationality 
Variable Before After p-value 
Lebanese (%) 
Hospitalization 77 (21.9) 74 (11.1) <0.01 
Laboratory 188 (53.4) 398 (59.8) 0.05 
Radiology 87 (24.7) 194 (29.1) 0.13 
Total 352 (100.0) 666 (100.0) - 
Palestinian (%) 
Hospitalization 5 (15.6) 4 (5.5) 0.87 
Laboratory 18 (56.3) 46 (63.0) 0.51 
Radiology 9 (28.1) 23 (31.5) 0.72 
Total 32 (100.0) 73 (100.0) - 
Other Arab Nationalities (%) 
Hospitalization 16 (24.2) 5 (5.3) <0.01 
Laboratory 31 (47.0) 55 (58.5) 0.14 
Radiology 19 (28.8) 34 (36.2) 0.32 
Total 66 (100.0) 94 (100.0) - 
Hospitalization 99 (21.4) 83 (9.8) <0.01 
Laboratory 247 (53.4) 506 (59.9) 0.02 
Radiology 116 (25.1) 255 (30.2) 0.05 
Total 462 (100.0) 844 (100.0) - 
*Reform implementation started August 2008 
 
 
Table 14. Requests by investigation type by Age before and after reform implementation in 
Roumieh correctional facility  











Hospitalization 43.9 (12.7) 44.2 (14.6) 0.86 
Laboratory 39.9 (12.2) 39.6 (12.1) 0.82 
Radiology 37.6 (10.6) 36.2 (11.1) 0.26 




Table 15. Requests by investigation type by duration of Incarceration before and after reform 
implementation in Roumieh correctional facility  
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 






Mean (SD) p-value 
Hospitalization 62.6 (43.5) 40.2 (32.2) <0.01 
Laboratory 49.6 (30.9) 43.2 (36.4) 0.02 
Radiology 47.0 (31.9) 36.7 (27.9) <0.01 
*Reform implementation started August 2008 
 
Table 16. Total Spending Costs on HealthCare Requests (Urgent and Non Urgent) before and 
after reform implementation in Roumieh correctional facility 
(November 2007- May 2009)* 
 
Spending Costs on HealthCare Bills 
 Before After Total 
Urgent 680 481 1161 
Non Urgent 462 844 1306 
Total 1142 1325 2467 
Total Cost (LBP) 723,353,927 748,409,110 1,471,763,037 
Total Cost (USD) 482,236 498,939 981,175 
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Figure 5. Data Timeline 
 
Policy Implementation  
      Effective Date 
        (August 7-2008) 
--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------  
                |                                                  |               |                                          | 
      Beginning of                                     Implementation                             End of  
   Data Collection                                  Period—no data                      Data Collection                                    
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• Feb. 2010 - Mar. 15, 2010
Data Analysis
•Mar. 15, 2010 - Apr. 15, 2010
Developing Report
•April 15, 2010 - July 2010
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Figure 7. Mean Waiting Time Between Medical Request and Result for Radiology 
Investigations Before and After the Reform Implementation 
 
 
Figure 8. Mean Waiting Time Between Medical Request and Result for Laboratory 
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Waiting Time Between Medical Request And Result For Laboratory Before 







Figure 9. Mean Waiting Time between Certain Hospitalization Time Points Before and After 
































Waiting Time between Certain Hospitalization Time Points Before And 






Figure 10. Mean Waiting Time Between a Medical Visit leading to a Request for 




Figure 11. Waiting Time Between a Medical Visit leading to a Request for Radiology 































Mean Interval (Days) Between a Medical Visit Leading to 
Hospitalization and Actual Admission Controlling for Patient Age 
[20- 40] (N = 83)




























Interval Between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for Radiology 
Test and Results Reporting Controlling  for Patient Age
[20- 40] (N = 239)
> 40 (N = 110)
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Figure 12. Mean Waiting Time Between a Medical Visit leading to a Request for Laboratory 


































Interval Between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for Laboratory 
Test and Results Reporting Controlling for Patient Age 
[20- 40] (N = 423)
> 40 (N = 326)
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Figure 13. Mean Waiting Time Between a Medical Visit leading to a Request for 































Interval Between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for 
Hospitalization and Actual Admission Controlling for Duration of 
Incarceration
< 4 Years (N = 107)
>= 4 Years (N = 75)
 77 
 
Figure 14. Mean Waiting Time between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for Radiology 
































Interval Between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for Radiology 
Investigations and Results Reporting Controlling for  Duration of 
Incarceration
< 4 Years (N = 264)
>= 4 Years (N = 85)
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Figure 15. Mean Waiting Time between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for Laboratory 


































Interval Between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for Laboratory  Investigation and 
Results Reporting Controlling for Duration of Incarceration
< 4 Years (N = 527)
>= 4 Years (N = 223)
P < 0.01 for all duration 




Figure 16. Mean Waiting Time between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for 





Figure 17. Mean Waiting Time Between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for Radiology 
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Interval Between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for Radiology 
Investigation and Results Reporting Controlling for Educational Level
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Intermediate (N = 140)
Secondary or above (N = 61)
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Figure 18. Mean Waiting Time between a Medical Visit leading to a Request for Laboratory 





































Interval Between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for Laboratory 
Investigation and Results Reporting Controlling for Educational Attainment
Elementary or 
Less (N = 259)
Intermediate (N = 
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Figure 19 Mean Waiting Time between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for 
Hospitalization and Actual Admission for Nationality Before and After the Reform 
Implementation 
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Figure 20 Mean Waiting Time between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for Radiology 
Investigation and Result Reporting for Nationality Before and After the Reform 
Implementation 
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Figure 21 Mean Waiting Time between a Medical Visit Leading to a Request for Laboratory 
Investigation and Result Reporting for Nationality Before and After the Reform 
Implementation 
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Figure 26. Mean Duration of Incarceration (Months) of Prisoners Requesting External Health 
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Appendix 1: IRB Approval 
 
Authorized signature on behalf of IRB 
 
Approval Date: 12/07/2009  
Expiration Date of Approval: 12/06/2010 
 
RE: Notice of IRB Approval by Expedited Review (under 45 CFR 46.110) 
Submission Type: Initial 
Expedited Category: 5.Existing or non-research data  
Study #: 09-2227 
Study Title: Evaluation of an Intervention to decrease Delays in External Health Care 
Delivery to Prisoners in a Correctional Facility in Lebanon 
 
This submission has been approved by the above IRB for the period indicated. It has been 
determined that the risk involved in this research is no more than minimal.  
 
Study Description:  
 
Purpose: To evaluate changes in administrative regulations aiming at decreasing time delays 
in external health care delivery to prisoners in the main correctional facility in Lebanon. 
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Participants: This is a study based only upon administrative data consisting of health care 
utilization records for prison inmates in Lebanon. There will no recruitment, enrollment, or 
direct contact with any prisoners for the study. Data will be assembled only from the 
administrative records that track the medical services provided to prisoners at the polyclinic 
of the correctional facility. Procedures: Data will be collected from the administrative records 
only. There are two indicators for the study: (1) timeliness of care (measured in days); and 
(2) number of requests for outside referral care. These indicators will be assessed before and 
after the implementation of a procedural reform for requests to transfer patient prisoners to 
outside care. The collected data will be analyzed for a time period ranging from the nine 
months proceeding to the nine months following the reform.  
 
Regulatory and other findings: 
 
This research meets criteria for a waiver of informed consent according to 45 CFR 46.116(d).  
 




Investigator’s Responsibilities:  
 
Federal regulations require that all research be reviewed at least annually. It is the Principal 
Investigator’s responsibility to submit for renewal and obtain approval before the expiration 
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date. You may not continue any research activity beyond the expiration date without IRB 
approval. Failure to receive approval for continuation before the expiration date will result in 
automatic termination of the approval for this study on the expiration date.  
 
When applicable, enclosed are stamped copies of approved consent documents and other 
recruitment materials. You must copy the stamped consent forms for use with subjects unless 
you have approval to do otherwise.  
 
You are required to obtain IRB approval for any changes to any aspect of this study before 
they can be implemented (use the modification form at ohre.unc.edu/forms). Any 
unanticipated problem involving risks to subjects or others (including adverse 
events reportable under UNC-Chapel Hill policy) should be reported to the IRB using the 
web portal at https://irbis.unc.edu/irb.   
 
Researchers are reminded that additional approvals may be needed from relevant 
"gatekeepers" to access subjects (e.g., principals, facility directors, healthcare system).  
 
This study was reviewed in accordance with federal regulations governing human subjects 
research, including those found at 45 CFR 46 (Common Rule), 45 CFR 164 (HIPAA), 21 
CFR 50 & 56 (FDA), and 40 CFR 26 (EPA), where applicable. 
 
Appendix 2: Cooperation with Academia: Plan to Call 
Organizations to Action 
 
Health care management of prison populations has been a concern found in literature in 
recent years.  A study on the management of health care providers to serve the needs of a city 
jail population  noted that The Medical Commission, Conference for the Abolition of 
Torture, sponsored by Amnesty International in 1973, ―recommended that medical personnel 
be employed by, and responsible to, an authority independent of the confining institution‖ 14.  
The recommended arrangement of such services included the following features: 
1. The correctional facility contracts with local health departments or other groups of 
health professionals, both for administration and for direct care provision. 
2. Services provided to prisoners include a comprehensive program of medical, dental, 
and pharmacy services, among others, delivered inside the correctional facility. 
3. Inpatient services are contracted with teaching or community hospitals. 
4. Salaries are commensurate with academic and private sector payments to physicians 
and other healthcare workers. 
 
Freeman’s study documents the change in administration and delivery of health services in a 
Baltimore city jail, switching from employment by the correctional facility to contractual 
services through a local physicians professional association.  This program was managed 
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jointly and, following later accreditation by the AMA, included training for medical students 
at Johns Hopkins School of Medicine.  As a result of this program, utilization of services 
decreased overall as did complaints about the service.  The proportion of prisoners with 
symptoms related to bad nerves, headaches, and substance abuse also fell. At the same time, 
interventions based on medications decreased from 80% to 51%.  Costs per patient increased 
from $588/prisoner-year to $670/prisoner-year; this was attributed to the higher salary scale 
rather than utilization of services.  
 
A study published in 2004 echoed the need for an alternative model to employed health care 
providers within a correctional facility 
15
.  In 1994, the State of Texas faced a rapidly 
growing prison population and escalating health care costs within a fragmented and ―largely 
inadequate‖ correctional medical care system.   The Texas legislature responded by 
developing a health delivery plan using a managed care network integrated with the state’s 
public medical schools and affiliated hospitals, providing medical, dental, and psychiatric 
care to the prison population based on a capitated rate.  The results, which included higher 
compliance with standards of care, improvements in health status for the population, and 
substantial cost savings, were achieved through the following system features: 
1. Standardized disease management guidelines and a common formulary. 
2. Ambulatory clinics and infirmary beds located in every correctional facility.  
3. Chronic care clinics, which respond to the prisoner’s special needs including hepatitis 
C, hypertension, psychiatric disorders, asthma, diabetes, latent TB, and HIV 
infection. 
4. Application of technology, such as telemedicine and electronic medical records. 
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5. Review of clinical practices and feedback to clinicians. 
 
A follow up editorial opinion published in the same journal highlighted the need to create a 
partnership between institutions of academic medicine and correctional systems, noting 
several obstacles but citing advantages to both parties 
16
.   
 
Academic Institutions Correctional Facilities 
Obstacles 
- Security concerns 
- Logistical complexity 
- Perceived federal restrictions on research 
involving prisoners 
- Hidden strategic importance of 
correctional medicine to public health 
- View of academic institutions as intrusive 
and naïve regarding security 
- Undervalued benefits of academic 
expertise 
- Unaware of opportunity to maximize 
fiscal resources 
Mutual Advantages 
- Education of health care professionals for future careers in correctional health care 
- Subspecialty consultations for difficult cases 
- Development of clinical practice guidelines 
- Evaluation of treatment interventions and outcomes among inmate-patient populations 




According to Kendig, achievement of long term public health and public safety goals will be 
significantly affected by the willingness of correctional systems and academic institutions ―to 
develop joint strategies, disavow prejudices, and explore new relationships‖ in the future 16. 
The literature reviewed above suggests that a system-based solution may be found through 
collaboration with local or regional academic centers and schools of public health. 
The opportunity exists for the ISF to partner with one or more academic institutions in order 
to create a plan and coordinate the logistical requirements to provide the following resources 
and services: 
 Medical residents to take assignment within Roumieh to assess and treat prisoner 
patients for medical and psychiatric conditions. 
 Public health graduate students to take assignment to assess the Roumieh 
administrative systems for providing care and make proposals to improve the process 
of health care service delivery. 
 
Such an opportunity would require the approval along the chain of command within the 
Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice and the executive leadership of the academic medical 
center(s).  This appendix describes the strategy and steps for such a plan, which represents 
the first such example of cooperation between the Internal Security Forces and academia in 
the history of Lebanon.   
 
Applying the recommended eight tools (Integral Vision, Systems Thinking, Presence, 
Inquiry, Conscious Conversation, Bridging, and Innovation) for a Leader as Mediator by 
Mark Gerzon in his book ―Leading through Conflict‖, we can transform conflict into 
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opportunity. Cooperation with academia is a result of an existing working dilemma at 
Roumieh Correctional Facility that would be transformed into an opportunity for the ISF, the 




Cooperation with academia integrates two approaches of work (Analytical vs. Task 
Development and Completion), bridges the gaps one step at a time, promotes collaboration 
and teamwork, and leverages the value of working together to achieve a common goal. 
Taking advantage of this opportunity will promote an environment where each person takes 
responsibility for the issue (dilemma) at hand, negotiates for issue resolution, becomes more 
deeply involved, and displays maturity by facing obstacles with openness. 
As a leader, defining clear goals, providing clear direction in an easily and understood 
language, fully understanding the system, responding to new developments, and expressing 
sincerity, transparency, support, maturity, reliability, attentiveness, and innovation are 
essentials to realizing his/her vision. 
 
Plan to Call Involved Organizations to Action 
1. Assess the situation and validate the urgency for the need to change through 
innovation: The Director of the Polyclinic has conducted an initial assessment of the 
health care system, identifying a tremendous shortage in medical and paramedical 
resources. For a total prisoner population of 4000, only three medical practitioners 
(contractual doctors) are available around the clock. Other specialists (seven: two 
cardiologists, one orthopedist, one ENT, one general surgeon, one ophthalmologist, 
one psychiatrist) provide consultation to prisoners on a voluntary basis; however, they 
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are not committed to a particular schedule. This critical situation leads to excessive 
delay in care and treatment. The urgency of this situation calls for additional 
resources (paramedical and medical staff); however, the hiring of permanent or 
temporary workforce can only be authorized by the government (Council of 
Ministers) which has frozen physician positions since 1997. To create a new solution 
to this impasse, the idea came about to build a cooperative joint venture with 
academia in order to access free resources to make up for the existing shortage, 
address critical health care needs of the prisoners, and build a relationship that is 
mutually beneficial and challenging to both parties while honoring the ideals of 
medicine to provide wellness to all. 
2. Find supporters for the plan, create a guiding coalition:  Initial contact has been made 
by the Polyclinic’s Director with representatives at the School of Medicine and 
School of Public Health, who have established that this opportunity is considered 
consistent with of the University’s mission around activities in the Community. ISF 
executives, including the Chief of Department of Health at ISF who presides over the 
Roumieh polyclinic, the Director of the Central Administration Unit who governs the 
Department of Health, and the General Director of the ISF within the Ministry of 
Interior and the Director of the Polyclinic have met and approved the general concept 
behind this opportunity.   
3. Create your vision: The guiding coalition identified above has the ability to create a 
common vision for all the participating staff, residents, and medical students that has, 
as its focus, the goal that no prisoner is left uncared for. Prisoners have the right to 
decent medical service and good health care, as secured by law. It is the responsibility 
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of the government to provide timely healthcare to prisoners similar to that in the 
community by whatever means possible; cooperation with academia is an alternative 
solution where there is no financial means to recruit and address prisoners’ needs for 
specialized consultation. 
4. Prepare the team through discussion and feedback; support the team’s development of 
the implementation plan, with team member’s providing the example for the larger 
system:  Prepare the team gradually, over the course of three months prior to the 
cooperative effort, with ongoing evaluation and monitoring throughout 
implementation, allowing the team to embrace the vision by elaborating on the 
benefits and purpose for cooperation. The team will discuss how this will affect their 
working environment and what procedures should be followed, sharing the outcome 
of their work with affected staff transparently and answering staff questions and 
concerns. The implementation plan should be clear, concise, realistic, and adaptive to 
the dynamics of the environment and people. The challenge lies in the different 
methods the two parties bring to the discussion.  One is academic with an analytical 
perspective; the other is military and oriented to task development and completion. 
Both are important perspectives but stylistically opposite. 
5. Give orders and follow up their realization:  
The academic institutions acceptance to the ISF offer of cooperation is considered the 
binding agreement of cooperation. ISF General Directorate will inform the Ministry 
of Justice (MOJ) about the new agreement, resulting in MOJ consent to the admission 
of residents and graduate students into the facility. Thereafter, the ISF General 
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Director will issue a service memo to all ISF staff, in particular to prison 
administration, informing them of the cooperative effort. 
As a result of the agreement, the polyclinic’s director in cooperation with 
representatives (both schools) will draft a new policy that describes the mechanism by 
which services are to be delivered (consents, approvals, workflow, etc.) and by which 
the polyclinic staff and schools resources will abide. 
In addition, the polyclinic’s director will, in cooperation with the prison’s director and 
schools representatives, draft a statement of understanding, accepting the terms of the 
cooperative agreement and citing the regulation that the schools resources will abide 
by, which must be signed and dated for acceptance prior to start of service.  
The ISF General Director must approve the corresponding policy. 
The polyclinic’s director is responsible for the planning and execution of the 
corresponding initiative. The polyclinic’s director will define the needed resources 
and, upon agreement of the resources provided from the schools, establish a schedule 
that is accepted by both parties. The director of the polyclinic will coordinate security 
clearance and logistics for residents and graduate students to access the facilities.  In 
addition, the Polyclinic Director will coordinate with health auxiliaries and prison 
administration to ensure that prisoner patients are appropriately scheduled and 
accompanied on time to the polyclinic. This level of coordination will require internal 
planning and change to the standard process, as too often prisoners are not brought in 
on time to their consultation due to a shortage of policemen to accompany prisoners 
physically to their destinations. 
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Effective planning and close follow up are required to capitalize on usage of the 
services of the resources provided. Effective collaboration is essential between the 
polyclinic resources and the schools. Site visit and orientation are provided to the 
schools resources and are informed accordingly of applicable laws, internal 
regulations (do’s and don’ts) and policies. 
Most importantly, the director of the polyclinic must ensure the continuity of the 
services provided by the school’s cooperation by creating and maintaining a 
productive and responsive environment so staff resources are stimulated, challenged 
and do not lose sight of their purpose.  In the same way, the director must ensure full 
cooperation and collaboration from the polyclinic staff and the prison administration 
staff. This is critical to the success and continuity of the effort because the prisons 
working dynamics (setting, people, and procedures) vary from that of the community: 
living conditions, health status, accessibility, security, slow due process, etc. The 
Polyclinic Director’s availability in time to resolve issues related to the cooperation or 
to a patient case is mandatory to the success of the cooperative effort.  
6. Create culture at the entity level reflecting leadership priorities and style:   
The norms of behaviors and shared values that are passed on throughout the years in 
Lebanese governmental institutions or specifically in Roumieh’s prison have 
persistently led to the failure and weakness of the system in place. Staff is not 
motivated, poorly educated, not qualified to the requirements of their job description, 
do not care about their work, have no ownership of their tasks, are more concerned 
with a short work schedule and are used to shortcuts and workarounds under the 
pretext that they are neglected, understaffed, undervalued, and fear the consequences 
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of taking initiatives. This type of culture is implanted and rooted in high level 
positions and passed on to lower level employees. In addition, the system of equal 
employment in governmental institutions is based on religious equality; therefore 
non-qualified people are hired just because they applied, while qualified people who 
apply are not hired because the quota has been surpassed. 
Cooperating with new people from outside their environment (and who do not fit in 
their system) and who furthermore are probably younger, more educated, eager to 
work, and more idealistic, sets the bar higher for the prison staff in terms of standards 
of work, motivation, and values. The new resources coming in with the anticipated 
policy will act as a trigger and a catalyst to change some elements within the 
polyclinic and prison administration culture, which will also affect the momentum 
and dynamics of service delivery. 
 
As Kotter, in his book ―Leading Change‖, states: ―Culture changes only after you 
have successfully altered people’s actions, after the new behavior produces some 
group benefit for a period of time and after people see the connection between the 
new action and the performance improvement‖, so the top priority is to successfully 
implement the cooperative effort so its objectives are realized and consequently 
deliver better health care services to prisoners, lend a hand to an overwhelmed staff 
with responsibilities that exceed their physical and intellectual capacities, and provide 
field training to Medical Schools residents 
18
. As a result, for the foreseeable future, 
the staff will pick up new behavior aligned with the values of delivering better quality 
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care to prisoners.  The polyclinic’s director mediator style is essential to the 
successful execution of this cooperative joint venture. 
 
Problems/Barriers Diagnosed through Kotter’s Model for Transformational Change 
Establish a Sense of Urgency: 
Academic institutions lack of commitment of the purpose and urgency of the agreement. 
They may not provide enough resources in time due to lack of interest of their residents or 
due to fear of the prison environment in terms of safety, communicable diseases, distance, 
and unknown working conditions. 
 
Create a Guiding Coalition: 
A conflict of schedule and purpose of all stakeholders: A persevering owner of the proposal 
(Director of the Polyclinic) is needed to plan accordingly (communication, coordination, and 
follow-up) for the successful creation of the Guiding Coalition; otherwise each is relying on 
the other one’s effort with the resulting cross-purpose assumptions leading to failure. 
Conflict of Interest: ISF key stakeholders who favor privatization of health services in prison 
may oppose the cooperation and not fully support its success in the short or long term. 
 
Develop a Vision and Strategy & Communicate the Change Vision: 
The vision and strategy is not supported fully at the higher end of decision making 
responsibility; they are only agreeing in principle to the proposal as stated to date because it 
addresses the shortage of resources at low cost and at low risk through its partnership with 
academia. There is less risk of abusing the health system financial resources and greater 
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likelihood of making appropriate patient referrals without personal financial gain. Skepticism 
is expected from various stakeholders and is likely to persist until tangible benefits are 
realized and the strategy is proven successful. 
In addition, there is the risk that the developer of this vision and strategy may be reassigned 
or transferred due to a political shift, or other unforeseen cause.  The loss of a champion that 
believes in the value of this cooperation may be fatal to the success of the project. 
 
Empower Employees: 
ISF staff are continually relocated or reassigned to fill in other posts or fill in vacancies due 
to shortage of resources, leading to loss of adequately trained employees. The transformation 
anticipated by this proposal may result in staff who have successfully altered their actions 
and values, only to be reassigned. 
Employees who perform well are given no incentives; there is no motivation for employees 
to alter their behavior other than a letter of recommendation that can be put in an employee 
file.  The ―command and control‖ management model of the prison system does not readily 
allow employees to take risks and experiment with non-traditional ideas and actions. 
Budget Shortage: No budget for training accompanies this proposal. Empowering employees 
by providing them necessary specialized training is very difficult. Only high level positions 
are sent to training, seminars, or workshops. All training is given on the field by the same 






Generate Short Term Wins: 
Short Term Wins may not be tangible due to lack of commitment or due to the chaos 
resulting from poor planning or unforeseen issues arising from the new ground being 
explored by both parties. 
Negative feedback from residents to their faculty of their experience may lead to reduction of 
resources or cancellation of the cooperative effort altogether as the formal agreement is not 
binding. 
 
Consolidate Gains & Reproduce: 
If the project is not allowed enough time (long term) to produce positive results, short term 
wins are discarded and reproducing the experience with other polyclinics or reproducing the 
experience for other forms of partnership will be lost. 
 
Anchor Approach in Culture: 
If proper leadership is lacking at any point in the command chain from high end to low, the 
experience turns into a lose-lose or win-lose relationship and the culture will not be changed. 
This approach must be allowed to sink in for the benefits to be realized in the long term. 
 
Implementation Plan 
1. Approval of Concept: During the project initiation, the champion of the vision must 
research the feasibility of the project through literature review (results of such 
cooperation in correctional facilities) and assess the acceptance of the idea by ISF and 
academic institutions through preliminary discussions and feedback. 
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2. Meeting of Guiding Coalition:  Organize an official visit by an ISF delegation headed 
by the General Director of the ISF to the Schools’ of Medicine and Public Health to 
see the new Out Patient Department (OPD) and how it is administered.  A meeting 
with both Deans’ of the Schools’ of Medicine and Public Health will be scheduled to 
discuss the possibilities of cooperation between the two organizations. The initial 
cooperative effort is based on Residents of different specialties and Master students in 
health management and policy who will be assigned to Roumieh to assess the 
situation and propose a solution concerning Health Administration and prisoner 
patients’ consultation to avoid their transportation outside the facility.  The specific 
objective will be to reduce delay in Health Care Delivery and thereby improve 
prisoner health status.  Action steps: 
a. Nomination of the committee to visit the academic institutions. 
b. Agenda development, including cooperative agreement, resident service 
expectations, management student expectations, touring of facilities, etc. 
c. Scheduling of date, time, and location. 
d. Completion of site visit with follow up report. 
3. Mobilize NGOs throughout the process toward adopting a policy of cooperation, 
developing an advocacy campaign timed to coincide with significant decision making 
points as determined by the guiding coalition or the project champion. 
4. Finalize cooperative agreement (scope, objectives, mobilize resources, activities, 
tentative schedule, etc.) and acceptance by ISF and cooperating schools. 
5. The Coalition members will present the cooperative agreement to ISF and 
participating institution leaders. 
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6. Draft a new policy that describes the mechanism by which services are to be 
delivered (consents, approvals, workflow, etc.). The policy will be written by the 
polyclinic’s director in collaboration with the cooperating schools representatives. 
The policy will be abided by the polyclinic staff and incoming resources.  
7. Secure the approval of the ISF General Director to the corresponding policy. 
8. Secure the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) consent to the admission of residents and 
graduate students into the facility. The due process takes place between ISF General 
Directorate, Ministry of Interior, and MOJ. 
9. The Coalition members will prepare for a joint conference to ―go public‖ with the 
proposal for exposure of the plan. 
10. Draft a statement of understanding that defines the terms of the cooperative 
agreement and cites the regulation that incoming resources will abide by. The 
statement will be written by polyclinic’s director in cooperation with the prison’s 
director and cooperating schools representatives. The statement will be accepted, 
signed and dated by incoming resources prior to start of service.  
11. Present the proposal and plans publicly at a conference involving the joint 
participation of ISF and the academic institution.   
12. Setup schedule of services that define resources and recurring time of service defined 
and approved by polyclinic’s director and cooperating schools representatives. 
13. Prepare security clearance of incoming resources to the facility. 
14. Setup first schedule patient consultations. 
15. Kickoff implementation: briefing, mobilization of resources, and preparation of 
facilities, equipments, and materials: First Milestone. 
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16. Ongoing issue management and close follow-up of the process. 
17. Ongoing evaluation and refinement of the policy (strategy, process, schedule, etc.). 
18. Periodical reporting on the activities and results in order to report on short term wins. 
19. Ongoing communication with and among all resources across ISF and cooperating 
institution boundaries. 
20. Maintain contact (throughout the process) with other institutions for future interest or 
expansion of cooperation; or as a contingency plan in case a Partnership with a 
particular school fails to progress. 
 
Appendix 3: ICRC Recommendations 
 
 
1. Health system structure Mid/Long-term 
 The ISF Health Service, under the ISF 
Central Administration, provides for the 
medical needs of the complete ISF staff 
and their families. In addition, the ISF 
Health Service is in charge of the health 
system and provision of medical services 
in Lebanese prisons. 
 Establish a countrywide "health in prison"-
master plan to provide adequate medical 
services to detainees, according to defined 
standards and in a cost efficient way. 
 Responsible authorities consider the 
establishment of an independent entity in 
charge of health in prisons: 
- With its own budget, 
- With its own human resources. 
 
 This independent entity would first need to 
be established within the existing ISF 
structure and could then be handed over in 
the framework of the inter-ministerial 
transfer. 
 
2. Human resources  Short-term 
 Insufficient numbers of sufficiently skilled 
health staff (medical doctors, nurses, and 
paramedical staff). 
 Nurses involved in administrative 
activities rather than in health care 
provision. 
 Implication of detainees and non-medical 
staff in health care delivery system (e.g. 
organization of the clinic, distribution of 
medicines, organization of access of 
detainees to health care services). 
 Insufficient training in some areas 
reported by health staff (e.g. infectious 
and mental diseases, management of 
 Increase the human resources according to 
the health needs and number of detainees. 
 Revise the tasks of registered nurses so 
that they are more directly involved in 
medical care. 
 Restrict the role of detainees to duties not 
involving provision of medical care. 
 Ensure that non-medical staff is not 
involved in the provision of medical care. 
 Provide specific training for all medical 
staff. 
 Improve working conditions for health 
care staff: 
- adjust the salaries and contracts to MoH 
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hunger strikes, coping with stress…) 
 Working conditions of health care staff in 




- challenging prison environment 
staff conditions. 
3. Detainees' access to health care inside 
prison  
Short-term 
 No medical entry screening by qualified 
doctor or nurse. Only laboratory tests for 
HIV, Hepatitis B, Syphilis and TB 

























 No active screening by medical staff. 
 Detainees did not have direct access to 
the prison's medical staff and thus did not 
have the opportunity to report their health 
complaints to the doctor or nurse directly 
 Revise the medical screening policy. 
 Ensure that all newly arrived detainees 
undergo a medical screening performed by 
health professionals. The medical 
screening should focus on: 
- Detection detainees suffering from 
contagious diseases (TB, scabies, 
diarrhea…) as they need to be separated 
until they have overcome the 
contagious stage of the disease; 
- Identification of detainees who need 
medical follow-up and ongoing 
treatment or specific treatment in case of 
emergency (diabetes, epilepsy, 
TB under treatment, persons living with 
HIV under treatment) as well as 
specific health issues such as drug and 
alcohol use and psychiatric 
disorders; 
- Detection of detainees with physical 
marks of violence and/or psychological 
disturbances related to a history of ill-
treatment. 
 Ensure that health staff transmits test 
results to detainees in a timely and 
confidential manner. 
 Ensure that treatment is possible in case of 
positive test results. 
 Ensure that the medical staff establishes an 
individual medical file for each incoming 
detainee. 
 Organize the health care service in order to 
enable detainees to approach the medical 
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nor on a confidential basis. 
 
 
 Difficulties and delays in access to 
medical services. 
 Short opening hours of dispensaries and 






 Detainees do not have sufficient and 
timely access to specialized services 






 Emergency medical care is hampered by 
security regulations and limited in terms 




 Lack of screening mechanisms to 
determine psychiatric health of detainees. 
 
 Insufficient number of beds in 
specialized psychiatric institutions. 
staff directly and on a confidential basis 
OR  
Develop an active screening (daily tour 
through the cells) by qualified nurses in 
order to register sick detainees. 
 Increase opening hours for consultations 
for detainees (currently, in Roumieh 
Prison, only from 10:00 until 13:00). 
Specific recommendations for Roumieh 
Prison: 
 Re-organize the health services, for 
example: 
- Put in place in each block a dispensary 
with a consultation room, basic 
emergency equipment and a pharmacy 
with essential drugs; 
- Place 1 MD 
 Establish Roumieh as a high quality 
medical centre for detainees with serious 
health problems. In Roumieh Medical 
Centre: 
- Ensure suitable arrangements to provide 
specialist consultations; 
- Deliver more specialized services; 
- Ensure that appropriate medical 
equipment is available. 
 Improve emergency equipment, 
procedures and provide sufficient first aid 
trained medical staff in the blocks as well 
as in the medical centre. 
 Ensure that security procedures do not 
obstruct immediate access to emergency 
services. 
 Improve screening mechanisms for 
detection of mentally ill detainees. 
 Provide sufficient qualified psychologists 
and psychiatrists. 
 Increase number of beds available for 




4. Detainees' access to external services Short-term 
 Long and complicated administrative 
procedures, passing through several 
medical, administrative and security 
steps, often resulting in delays, and 
sometimes refusals. 
 Difficulties in the organization of the 
transport and/or the escort. 
 Access to external facilities more 
difficult for detainees waiting for trial 
than for sentenced detainees. 
 Constraints related to outside facilities 
(waiting lists, limited number beds, 
outstanding payments, security 
arrangements) 
 Improve the access for all detainees to 
referral service. To ensure relevant safe 
and timely referrals: 
- Evaluate and revise the procedures of 
access to the external health services 
(emergency services, external 
consultation by specialists) 
 
In Roumieh Medical Centre: 
 Establish diagnostic laboratory capacity 
and ensure an appropriate number of 
qualified laboratory technicians; 
 Install an X-Ray machine and qualified 
staff; 
 Increase availability of specialized 
services, e.g. dental services. 
5. Quality of services provided  Short-term 
 System with individual medical files for 
each detainee not well established.  
 Medical files predominantly limited to 
prescriptions alone. Medical history, 
notes on physical examination, diagnostic 
results, and diagnosis and follow-up 




 Adequate medical registers exist, but not 
used properly (no diagnosis or treatment 
recorded). 
 The centralized data information system 
not yet used in an appropriate and 
efficient manner for health care planning. 
 
 
 Standard clinical guidelines for 
diagnostics, diagnosis and treatment not 
 Put in place systematic medical entry 
screening procedures, performed by health 
professionals. 
 Improve the medical file system for each 
patient: 
- All detainees in all prisons should have 
an individual medical file where every 
contact with medical services is recorded. 
- Every medical consultation has to be 
properly documented with history, clinical 
examination, diagnostic, diagnosis, 
treatment. 
- Ensure respect for the patients' 
confidentiality 
 Systematic entry of diagnosis and 
treatment into existing medical registers. 
 Reinforce the centralized data information 
system. 
The centralized data information system has 
to respect the rules of confidentiality 
regarding to the medical files. 
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existing, except for TB and HIV 
management. 
 Lack of physical examination during 
consultation. 
 No active screening and follow-up of the 
sick detainees by medical staff. 
 
 
 System for Quality Assurance and 
Control to monitor and/or supervise the 
provision of health care not in place. 
Audits limited to checks of medical 
stocks. 
 
 Establish national clinical guidelines for 
diagnostics, diagnosis and treatment, cf. 
guidelines for the management of TB and 
HIV. 
 Train all medical doctors working in the 
prisons (including those working for 
NGOs & Academia) and ensure that 
Standard clinical guidelines are applied. 
Mid/Long-term 
 Establish, at central level, a well 
functioning Quality Assurance and 
Control team tasked with development and 
implementation of monitoring and 
supervision tools/mechanisms. 
 Establish technical health advisory boards 
supporting all prisons with regular 
information exchange. 
 
6. Ethical considerations in health care for 
detainees 
Short-term 
 Medical confidentiality not respected. 
Co-detainees as well as non-medical 
 ISF staff implicated in the organization of 
the access to, and provision of health 
care. Compulsory blood testing in the 
framework of systematic laboratory 
screening in Roumieh and Tripoli 
Prisons. Tests not explained to the 
detainees. 
 No feedback on test results given, except 
for detainees with positive tests results. 
 Mandatory HIV testing for detainees is 
unethical and ineffective. HIV testing 
carried out without the expressed consent 
of the patient and without pre- and post-
test counseling. 
 
 HIV positive detainees strictly segregated 
from their co-detainees, causing undue 
 Ensure that non-medical staff is not 





 All tests performed should be explained 
and performed by health professionals. 
 
 
 Provide feedback to all detainees tested. 
 
 Prohibit mandatory HIV testing. Ensure 
that HIV testing is voluntary and 
explained: accompanied by adequate pre-
test and post-test counseling and only 




stigma against them. 
 A number of detainees were identified 
who, due to their health condition, were 
at risk of imminent death or were unable 
to take care of their basic needs of 
themselves. 
 
 In Tripoli women Prison, survey carried 
out by civil society organization without 
informing tested detainees about test 
results and without ensuring treatment in 
case of positive results. 
 
 End segregation of HIV positive detainees 
and provide awareness raising activities. 
 
 Assess cases of detainees who, due to their 
health condition, should not continue to be 
detained and implement existing 
procedures and laws aiming for those 
 
 Ensure that any survey/research carried 
out in the prisons follows ethical 
procedures required in any type of health 




 Put in place a Medical Advisory Board 
which will ensure that medical practices in 
all prisons are consistent with medical 
ethical standards. This is particularly 
important in the following areas: 
- Medical confidentiality; 
- HIV testing procedures; 
- Research projects in prisons. 
7. Medical supply and pharmacy  Short-term 
 The ICRC did not receive sufficient 
information to fully understand the 
financing of the current medical supply 
system. 
 No stand-alone budget for the medical 
supply to prisons. 
 Long waiting times between prescription 
and receiving medication.  
 Improve timely access to medicines 
according to detainees' needs. 
 Medication delivered to prisons do not 
always correspond to medication ordered. 
 External support from families and/or 
NGOs for supply of medication. 
 See above, preliminary remarks. 
 Establish a stand-alone budget for the 
medical supply to prisons. 
 Improve timely access to medicines 




 Improve the medicines supply system in 
all the prisons through: 
- Establishment of an essential drug list 
specific to prisons; 
- Ensuring that medical doctors, including 
specialists, are prescribing according to 
the a/m drug standard list; 
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- Establishment of a funding system to 
purchase medicines that are not part of the 
standard list. 
8. Health services financing  Mid/long-term 
 
 The ICRC did not receive sufficient 
information to fully understand the 
current health care service financing. 
 Lack of stand-alone budget for the health 
care delivery system in prisons. 
 See above, preliminary remarks. 
 Establish a stand-alone budget for the 
health care delivery system in prisons. 
9. Privileged access to health care  Short-term 
 Reports of detainees having to pay for 
access to treatment. 
 Ensure that all detainees have an equitable 
and free access to health care, according to 
their needs without any discrimination. 
10. Coordination with external 
organizations involved in health care 
provision  
Short-term 
 Lack of coordination and monitoring of 
the health activities of external actors by 
prison authorities. 
 
 ISF and Ministry of Interior take up a 
coordination role and organize regular 
meetings with external actors 
(NGOs/Universities) involved in health 
care provision in prisons. 
 Roumieh Prison authorities take up a 
coordination role. 
11. Structural transfer of prisons and the 
Inter-Ministerial Commission  
Mid/long-term 
 The issue of health not yet clearly 
defined in the plan of transition of 




 The role of the Ministry of Health not yet 
defined in the framework of the transition 
process 
 A strategic plan for the health service 
delivery structure in prisons should be 
developed in the framework of the existing 
five years plan for the transition of the 
prisons from the Ministry of Interior to the 
Ministry of Justice. 
 The role and responsibility of the Ministry 
of Health should be defined. 
 
Appendix 4: Policy Advocacy for the Centralization of Health 
Services 
 
In 1949, a presidential decree was issued on February 11, 1949, number 14310, regarding the 
organization of correctional facilities, article number 1. The decree was later amended on 
February, 21, 1967, decree number 6687, to delegate the prison responsibility to the Minister 
of Interior. However, it is in 1964 that a presidential decree was issued to propose that an 
independent Central Correctional Administration is solely responsible for prison 
administration (including Health Services Delivery) and reports to the Ministry of Justice. 
This decree never went into effect. 
 
Later in 1984, a ministerial decision number 313, dated December 10, 1984, article number 
2, was taken to delegate the health care of prisons to ISF medical centers. 
 
The following policy would implement the presidential decree, proposed in 1964, and 
develop procedures and policies to support its implementation. The policy proposes that the 
primary responsibility of prison administration is delegated to an independent Central 





The main responsibilities of the independent Central Correctional Administration would be 
to administer the prison system, ensure security and most importantly oversee the provision 
of primary health services delivery through a Medical Services Division. The number of 
stakeholders involved in the workflow and approval process would be reduced, so that most 
procedures would be automatically approved if the providers follow certain prescribed care 
pathways.  Isolated cases may still be subject to prior approval (such as high profile 
prisoners, or those who pose a high security risk).   Most importantly, the supporting policies 
must ensure timely provision of health care services to prisoners based on their medical 
needs. These policies would be created and aligned with the Ministry of Justice and the 
Central Correctional Administration needs and/or constraints. Such systems are in place in 
many correctional facilities in Europe, namely Austria. 
 
Legislative Feasibility 
This policy option is highly feasible since the 1964 presidential decree was not cancelled (as 
described in the background section of this paper). In order to implement the 1964 
presidential decree, the Minister of Justice presents the decree to the Conseil des Ministres 
for revival (activation) and for implementation. The Conseil des Ministres will then request 
from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior to redraft a new decree project that 
takes into consideration legislations changes that took place during the period of 1964 to 
present and human rights. Thereafter, the same procedures take place for decree issuance and 
publication (as stated in the Background section of this paper).  
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In fact, as of today a Task Force has been formed under funding from the United Nations to 




The costs to implement a new Central Correctional Administration would be high since it is a 
new agency.  This new administration funds are allocated from within the Ministry of Justice 
expenditures. However funds provisions for the specific correctional health services are the 
same (from ISF to MOJ) from an ongoing cost perspective. Though ongoing costs would be 
the same but once the administrative barriers are reduced, cost may potentially increase as 
more people would end up being transported outside the prison system for care.  
 
Policy Advocacy Strategy 
The Policy Advocacy Strategy addresses the short term goal of creating a legislative study 
commission to study this problem and the long term goal of reintroducing the policy as a 
decree and exert pressure on policy and decision makers for putting forth a plan of action for 
implementation. 
The policy advocacy strategy is based on mobilizing: 
a) Stakeholders:  Involve stakeholders who support such policy and legislation in 
order to influence policy decision makers. 
b) Legislators: Lobby legislators to appoint a task force to analyze and report on the 
situation in correctional facilities, namely health services delivery and prisoner’s 
right to proper care. The task force should include representatives from primary 
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stakeholder groups - public health advocacy groups, policymakers, and legal 
experts.   
c) Media: Mobilize policy makers’ constituents in supporting the legislation and 
capturing the attention of policy makers by setting the light on health delivery 
issues in prison through the use of Media Campaigns and specialized TV 
programs. The media can demonstrate to the general public the need for prison 
reform, namely health care delivery improvement, and its impact on the 
community. 
d) Grassroots: Mobilize policy makers’ constituents, politically affiliated groups, or 
prisoners’ families and lawyers to organize various events, campaigns, and 
petitions to lobby with governmental officials. 
a) Stakeholder Analysis 
Likely Allies of the Policy 
1) NGOs, Non Governmental Organizations, are primary stakeholders because they care 
about the well being of the prisoners for humanitarian, ethical, and social grounds. 
Prisoners with contagious diseases released to society would spread diseases back to 
the community; Drug addicts are likely to repeat offenses if not rehabilitated, etc. 
These are some of the reasons that would justify NGOs mobilization toward adopting 
such policy. 
Some of the NGOs are:  
 AJEM (Association Justice & Mesirecord): Their purpose is to claim prisoners’ rights 
to legal and fair representation and humanitarian treatment.  
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 Homonerie Generale des Prisons: Organization of religious representatives in 
Lebanon who take care of the spiritual and humanitarian needs of prisoners. They 
have good networking, actively lobby with decision makers (legislators), impact the 
media, and maintain contact with prisoners’ families. 
 Medecins du Monde (A French NGO financed by the EU for a prison based program 
grant). They currently provide paramedical services, logistic support and legal follow-
up for prisoners (especially illegal immigrants). They also create programs for 
hygiene promotion, first aid services training, etc. They cooperate with AJEM. 
 ICRC (International Committee of Red Cross): They visit the prisoners and listen to 
their health problems and other humanitarian issues. 
 UN-HCR (United Nations Haute Commissariat des Refugiés; High Committee for 
Refugees): They check on the condition of political prisoners who are seeking 
political asylum.  
 Lawyer Syndicate: Lawyers are very aware of the overall situation in prison and 
occurring injustices. Through the Lawyer Syndicate, lawyers can work closely with 
the MOJ and propose to reactivate the 1964 law that proposes similar policy. The 
Lawyer Syndicate can advocate for improvement of the conditions and 
overpopulation of the prison. 
 Other organizations dealing with Human Rights and Prisoners Rights. 
2) Internal Security Forces General Directorate; ISF would support transferring prison 
health to a Central Correctional Administration because the prison administration was 
supposed to have been housed temporarily in the ISF, but this temporary structure had 
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become more permanent and has made it more difficult for the ISF to focus on its 
core functions of ensuring the internal security of the country. 
 
As part of the advocacy campaign, NGOs will be mobilized to contact decision makers like 
the Minister of Justice, Minister of Interior, Prime Minister, and/or the President to make 
legislation changes. Currently, NGOs support prisoners on a case by case basis. 
Even more, NGOs can organize for the first time a specialized Conference whose purpose is 
to improve the health and overall conditions at the correctional facilities. The Prime Minister 
(or Prime Minister Representative) and Ministers of the Interior, Justice, and Public Health 
are invited to attend. The Conference can be funded by international organizations (like the 
UN) and local donors (other NGOs and interest groups). The proposed policy is distributed 
for discussion and study among small groups of experts, in the form of Task Force 
Committees. During the closure session, the small groups raise issues and make 
recommendations. During the Conference, a follow-up committee is formed to create the 
roadmap on how to advocate for this policy: How to influence decision makers (Political 
Parties, President, Prime Minister, Ministers, Deputies, etc.).  
 
Likely Opponents of the Policy 
1) Ministry of Interior (MOI) may not want to lose the power and status quo attached 
to Administration of Prison through the ISF. They may argue that they are responsible 
for internal security and have the expertise to instill order. Prisoners violate the civil 




 We counter argue: Enforcing law and order within correctional facilities 
requires specialized skills on administrative and psychological levels. 
Administering a correctional facility requires more than security and order. It 
requires servicing a population (prison community) who has special needs and 
suffers from specific disorders. 
 ISF has not demonstrated the capability, as of today, to establish standards of 
conduct and procedures required for maintaining a decent correctional facility: 
There are problems related to sanitation, nutrition, health conditions, security, 
order and corruption, etc. 
2) Ministry of Justice (MOJ) may oppose operating the Prison Administration due to 
lack of resources and expertise, etc. We counter argue that a new central prison 
administration under the control and supervision of the MOJ has more leverage than 
ISF to administer the correctional facilities in Lebanon because bureaucratic 
procedures are simplified and Prisoners’ follow through the law system is respected. 
New specialized procedures, services, and resources are created or fulfilled to align 
with the needs of the prison population. 
b) Legislative Strategy 
There are three options for introducing the Legislation related to the proposed Policy. 
Option 1: Bureaucratic Procedure 
Being the Director of the Polyclinic at the Central Correctional Facility in Lebanon – 
Roumieh, gives me the opportunity to observe closely the health situation in prison and 
identify the health care needs of prisoners and make recommendations on how to improve on 
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the process of Health Care delivery as well as advocate for the Centralization of Health 
Services Delivery Policy.  
My bureaucratic procedure strategy is to formally deliver the message to the policy decision 
makers by writing a report in which I describe the current situation and recommend the 
Policy as a solution to the problem. 
1. The report will be sent to the Director of the Department of Health at the ISF who in 
turn will submit to the Director of the Central Administration Unit at the ISF – 
Administration Division. The Central Administration reports to the General Director 
of the ISF. The Central Administration is responsible for all logistics. 
2. The Central Administration reviews the proposal and sends it to the General Director 
of the ISF – Planning and Organizing Section who studies the report and will send a 
summary to the General Director for review.  
3. If the General Director approves the proposal, he will send it to the Ministry of 
Interior - Common Administration.  
4. The Common Administration studies the Project and sends a summary to the Minister 
of Interior.  
5. The Minister of Interior will then send it to the Minister of Justice in case of approval. 
6. The Minister of Justice will delegate the study and evaluation of the project to the 
Attorney General.  
 A meeting will take place at the Attorney General Office attended by the Attorney 
General, the Director of the Polyclinic, and the Director of the Department of Health at 
the ISF, the Director of the Correctional Facilities (Gendarmerie) at the ISF, and the 
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Attorney General Staff to discuss the project. Based on the meeting discussions, some 
changes or recommendations can take place.  
 If the project is approved, the project is raised by all parties to the Minister of Justice. 
The Minister of Justice and Minister of Interior propose it to the Conseil des Ministres for 
discussion in the form of a ―law project‖.  
 If the Conseil des Ministres accepts the project, it transfers it to the Parliament (since 
expenditures provisioning is required) for approval.  
 The Parliament in turn transfers the ―decree project‖ to the Administration and Justice 
Committee at the Parliament for evaluation and recommendation. The Administration 
and Justice Committee studies the project and contacts the MOJ and MOI Ministers for 
any needed clarifications. 
 Once the committee approves the project or has introduced modifications, it reintroduces 
it for discussion at the General Assembly at the Parliament, where the Conseil des 
Ministres is present for possible discussion. The Parliament votes in the presence of the 
Conseil des Ministres. Once the Parliament approves the decree project, it is law; 
however the law is still unpublished. The parliament then sends the law to the Conseil des 
Ministres for issuance and publication. The signatures of the Minister of Justice, Minister 
of Interior, Minister of Finance, and Prime Minister are needed to send the law to the 
President for signature. Once the President signs the law, the decree is published in the 
Official Journal. 
 
Please note that the difference between a decree and a law is that a decree is issued by the 
Conseil des Ministres and a law is made by the Parliament. 
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NGOs can take a major role in advocating with policy makers because they interact closely 
with prisoners. They can testify in a legislative forum and lobby with individual legislators. 
Throughout the process, direct contact and communication with each decision maker takes 
place to ensure the report gets evaluated timely, and moved next in the workflow process. 
The process is iterative and is subject to conflictive politically influenced views. It is possible 
at each intervention that clarifications are needed and the report gets forwarded back for 
further discussion. 
Option 2: Mobilize deputies of the Parliament 
The various stakeholders would lobby and contact various deputies directly or through 
political and interest groups to adopt the project. Ten (10) deputies out of 120 deputies in the 
Lebanese Parliament, who adopt the policy, can raise the project proposal to the Conseil des 
Ministres (Lebanese Constitution article 77 dated 9/21/1990) for discussion. The Conseil des 
Ministres will discuss it and upon approval will send it back to the Parliament as a Law 
Project. 
Option 3: MOJ Initiative 
As part of an overall judiciary system reform, the Ministry of Justice, on its own initiative, 
can propose the policy change to the Conseil des Ministres and ask to revive the law of 1964 
and to directly implement the law.  
The Minister of Justice presents the decree to the Conseil des Ministres for revival 
(activation) and implementation. The Conseil des Ministres will then request from the 
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior to redraft a new decree project that takes into 
consideration the humanitarian rights of the prisoners and respects the legislation changes 
that took place during the period of 1964 to present.  
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Parliament voting is required for approval since allocation of additional funds and redirection 
of funds from one Ministry to another is needed. The same procedures are invoked thereafter 
for decree issuance and publication (as stated in the Background section of the Policy 
Analysis Paper and as discussed above under Option 1: Bureaucratic Procedure).  
 
c) Media Strategy 
In Lebanon, the population is sympathetic to the plight of prisoners. Most prisoners are there 
due to economic and social reasons. 
In order to shed the light on health care delivery issues in correctional facilities, the public 
masses must be informed about the current situation in order to influence the public opinion 
towards a pro-policy opinion. Some of the media based policy advocacy strategy outlets are: 
- Press conferences for official statements by health specialists, public health 
advocates, law specialists or judges, ex-officers, ex-prisoners, prisoners’ families and 
lawyers. 
- Documentaries using supporting evidence, pro-policy arguments, comparative health 
care delivery in correctional facilities in developed countries, etc. 
- Specialized TV programs that host real life cases or discusses stakeholders’ views of 
the current issues. 
- TV ads and Campaigns, funded by NGOs, interest groups, small groups, raising 
funds from grassroots, etc. 
- Journal and Web ads and campaigns. 
 NGOs have a major role to play in publicizing the timeliness of health care delivery issue 
by contacting the Media and proposing interviews with prisoners in order to pressurize 
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policy makers. The Media does however need consent from the MOI. Previous interviews 
have taken place inside the prison, where journalists have interviewed prisoners about 
their environment condition and the quality of care and treatment they receive within the 
premises. 
 
Please note that the ISF has no right to contact or influence the media or publicize any issues 
since they are a governmental and military entity (unless an official statement is issued to the 
media by the General Directorate or the MOI). NGOs will mainly contact the media. 
 
d) Grassroots Strategy 
Grassroots (Constituents, politically affiliated groups, etc.) can lobby with their deputies and 
with the Committee of Human Rights in the Lebanese Parliament, especially the President of 
the Committee, to actively propose a solution to the health care problem in prison 
specifically and to the overall prison condition by adopting the proposed policy. 
Grassroots would organize and lobby for the policy through: 
- Organizing demonstrations. 
- Gathering signatures for petitions. 
- Raising money from many small donors for advertising or campaigning. 
- Asking individuals (ex-prisoners, prisoners’ families, prisoners’ lawyers, human 
activists, etc.) to submit opinions to media outlets and government officials. 
- Putting up posters. 




By adopting the above strategy and mobilizing resources and organizations toward adopting 
the Policy, we could achieve our short term goals and on the long term, during the following 
five years, have a correctional facility system in place that reinforces timely and quality 
health care to inmates and in turn would have a positive impact on the rehabilitation of 
inmates back into the community and society.
Appendix 5: Additional Figures 
 












External Health Care Requests Distribution by Investigation Type





External Health Care Requests Distribution by 
Facility
A ( N=403) B ( N=418) C ( N=288) D ( N=197)
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External Health Care Requests Distribution by Educational Attainment
Illiterate ( N=236) Elementary ( N=260) Under secondary ( N=521)
Secondary ( N=165) Above secondary ( N=124)
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External Health Care Requests Distribution by Nationality
Lebanese ( N=1018) Palestinian ( N=105) Syrian ( N=81)






















Mean Patient Age By Type of Investigation
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A (N=403) B (N=418) C (N=288) D (N=197)
77 54 33 18
199 259 177 118
























































P < 0.05 (Chi square test)
 130 
 




Figure 36. External Health Care Requests Distribution by Investigation Type Before and 
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586 64 47 39 17











































External Health Care Requests by Investigation Before and After 
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